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BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

DEAN INGE AND HIS EXPOSITION OF NEOPLATONISM.

Submitted by

Russell Bigelow Lisle

A.B. Ohio Northern Univ. 1912.

S.T.B. Boston Univ. School of Theol. 1915.

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1930.

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THESIS.

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THEORY OF THE EARTH AND ITS HISTORY

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investigate the effects of the

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results of the experiment.

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will be devoted to a

description of the

experimental method.

The second part will

present the results of the

experiment.

The third part will

discuss the implications of the

results of the study.

The fourth part will

conclude the study.

The fifth part will

present the conclusions of the

study.

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- (2) The second item is the "Detailed Information" which is a more complete statement of the facts and circumstances.
- (3) The third item is the "Conclusions" which are the results of the investigation.
- (4) The fourth item is the "Recommendations" which are suggestions for the improvement of the situation.
- (5) The fifth item is the "Summary" which is a brief statement of the main points of the report.
- (6) The sixth item is the "Appendix" which contains the material which is supplementary to the main body of the report.
- (7) The seventh item is the "Index" which is a list of the subjects treated in the report.
- (8) The eighth item is the "Bibliography" which is a list of the sources of the information used in the report.
- (9) The ninth item is the "List of Figures" which is a list of the figures included in the report.
- (10) The tenth item is the "List of Tables" which is a list of the tables included in the report.
- (11) The eleventh item is the "List of Illustrations" which is a list of the illustrations included in the report.
- (12) The twelfth item is the "List of References" which is a list of the references used in the report.
- (13) The thirteenth item is the "List of Abbreviations" which is a list of the abbreviations used in the report.
- (14) The fourteenth item is the "List of Symbols" which is a list of the symbols used in the report.
- (15) The fifteenth item is the "List of Units" which is a list of the units used in the report.
- (16) The sixteenth item is the "List of Definitions" which is a list of the definitions used in the report.
- (17) The seventeenth item is the "List of Acronyms" which is a list of the acronyms used in the report.
- (18) The eighteenth item is the "List of Initials" which is a list of the initials used in the report.
- (19) The nineteenth item is the "List of Footnotes" which is a list of the footnotes included in the report.
- (20) The twentieth item is the "List of Endnotes" which is a list of the endnotes included in the report.
- (21) The twenty-first item is the "List of References" which is a list of the references used in the report.
- (22) The twenty-second item is the "List of Abbreviations" which is a list of the abbreviations used in the report.
- (23) The twenty-third item is the "List of Symbols" which is a list of the symbols used in the report.
- (24) The twenty-fourth item is the "List of Units" which is a list of the units used in the report.
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- (27) The twenty-seventh item is the "List of Initials" which is a list of the initials used in the report.
- (28) The twenty-eighth item is the "List of Footnotes" which is a list of the footnotes included in the report.
- (29) The twenty-ninth item is the "List of Endnotes" which is a list of the endnotes included in the report.
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(o) The fifteenth part of the chapter

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PART ONE

Dean Inge and His Exposition of Neoplatonism.

In his latest book, "Labels and Libels", Dean Inge says, "No biography of me shall ever be written, if I can prevent it."¹ He proceeds to give a few reminiscences in which it is his avowed purpose to say as little about himself as may be possible. This spirit of diffidence and independence, it seems, may be taken as almost characteristic of the great Dean of St. Paul's. He appears as one who is deeply absorbed in contemplation. From time to time he emerges long enough to pronounce some worthwhile judgments upon men, times, and institutions but he gives one not the slightest hint that he ever has or ever shall become the personal champion of a cause of right or the personal opponent of a present course of wrong doing. He reminds one of Henry Adams whose "Autobiography" reveals him as a viewer and a reviewer of great movements in society but he himself is just standing outside the circle unperturbed and untouched. There is a certain aristocratic aloofness in Dean Inge that may be said to be almost characteristic. While the above characterization may be a little overdrawn, it is the feeling of the writer that any careful study of the Dean's writings will reveal that a warm social passion is not an outstanding characteristic. He makes weighty, and worthwhile pronouncements upon topics varying from that of the Philosophy of Plotinus to "Birth Control", and "Social Life in the Next Hundred

1. Inge - Labels and Libels p.248.

Years" yet these are pronouncements of a cool outsider, lacking in a broad human sympathy such as one would find in a man living close to the anxious heart of the race.

There is an old adage, "It is a cold wind that blows nobody good", and the fact that Dean Inge lacks in sympathy for the race may be turned to good account in many ways. For example, St. Francis of Assisi would have made a sorry mark in the business world, yet his lack here is more than compensated for in his devotion to his lady poverty. Paul says that he became all things to all men which was a good principle for Paul in the light of his basic purpose, but Dean Inge in the light of another purpose, refuses to become all things to all men. Both principles are justifiable provided that the purpose be noble. For the Dean, the purpose seems undoubtedly to be that of painstaking scholarship. Dean Inge is first a scholar and everlastingly a scholar. Few modern writers give more convincing proof of intimate contact with the mind of the age and with the mind of the ages. It is only natural that the Dean of St. Paul's should give us a fine example of scholarship for he comes of a line of scholars. He says "My grandfather, Edward Churton, Archdeacon of Cleveland, and for forty years rector of Crayke, was an old-fashioned scholar and divine, author of 'The Early English Church', then the best popular book on the subject; of 'The Cleveland Psalter', a metrical version of the Psalms; of two volumes of poems, and of a learned work on the Spanish poet Gongora, which is still quoted with respect by students of Spanish. He lived mainly in his library, well stocked with folios of theology, including all the

verbose Fathers of the Church, and all the Anglo-Catholic divines from the Laudians to Pusey".¹

His father, William Inge, who married the only daughter of Edward Churton, was a fellow of his college and had been the fast bowler on the Oxford Eleven. He came to Crayke as tutor to the Archdeacon's sons, three of whom won scholarships at Eton, and the fourth was nominated to the foundation at Charterhouse. My father served as curate at Crayke, refusing preferment, till the Archdeacon died in 1874; after which he held a living in Staffordshire, till he was appointed Provost of Worcester College in Oxford in 1881 and soon afterwards was offered the bishopric of Salisbury. This last honor so shocked his modesty that he refused by return of post, without even telling his wife." ². Thus on both sides Dean Inge comes of studious ancestors.

Concerning His Early Years.

The Dean of St. Paul's was born at Crayke, Yorkshire, June sixth, 1860. These were years of what might be called splendid isolation. He tells us that Crayke was "very much cut off from the world". ³. The chief means of travel to York was behind two fat horses, which covered the distance in two hours. Railroad travel was considered dangerous and he says that they were taught to say their prayers with extra care before embarking on a journey by train. Such excitements were few and far between. The family had hardly any neighbors. He says that his parents had abundant leisure which they devoted to the education of their

1. Inge. Labels and Libels p. 235.
2. " " " " p. 236.
3. " " " " p. 234.

children. This education consisted in reading aloud and "copy drawing". The children at an early age were introduced to Shakespeare, Spenser, Tennyson, Sir Walter Scott, and several books on history. Concerning this early education he says, "The excellence of my father's classical teaching may be judged from the success of the young Churtons, and from my position as second on the list of Eton Scholars after only three months at a preparatory school. We had indeed a splendid education, such as no children get in these days." 1.

Practically the only excitement in the community was a cricket match which was won by the Oxford Blues. Sunday was what he calls a "Mitigated Puritan Sabbath". They were not allowed to play the same games that were played on week days. From the brief description of these years at Crayke one gets the impression that they were not overpleasant. The bright spot seems to be his memory of his early education under his father. It is easy to understand how his early years were a definite influence in determining what his work should be. The emphasis on religion and the emphasis on education were the determining factors. One gets the impression that his early life was given over chiefly to preparation for "the examinations", a preparation that was enjoyed, one suspects, because there seemed to be nothing else to do. These years of isolation at Crayke, may also account for some of the Dean's seeming lack of passion for humanity. He seems to have been brought up in an atmosphere of aristocratic seclusion, having few or no contacts with what Lincoln calls the

common people. On this point it is of interest to note that Harold Begbie, that champion of the soul of the common man, says of him: "He thinks of mankind with interest, not with affection. Humanity is a spectacle, not a brotherhood." After quoting the Dean to the effect that 'there is not the slightest probability that the largest crowd will ever be gathered in front of the narrow gate', he adds: "Still one could wish that he felt in his heart something of the compassion of his Master for those who have taken the road to destruction." 1.

The emphasis upon education in the Dean's early life leads one to anticipate rare accomplishments in the field of scholarship. There is not the slightest evidence that these anticipations have not been fully realized. Dean Inge is first of all a scholar. His essays upon general themes and his contributions to the field of scholarship reveal that he has been on long journeys in company with the greatest minds of the ages. He is painstaking to the last degree and his attainments are little short of marvelous. The following list of educational accomplishments is taken from "Who's Who 1930 English edition": Eton, Kings College, Cambridge, Bill Scholar Porson Prizeman, 1880; Porson Scholar 1881; Craven Scholar and Browne Medallist 1883; First Class Classics 1882 and 1883; Hare Prizeman 1885; Assistant Master at Eton 1884-1888; Fellow of King's 1886-1888; Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford 1889-1904; Select Preacher at Oxford 1893-1895, 1903-1905, 1920-1921; Cambridge, 1901, 1906, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1920, 1924; Bampton Lecturer 1899; Honorary D.D.

1. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.41.

Aberdeen 1905: Paddock Lecturer, New York, 1906: Lyman Beecher Lecturer, Yale, 1925: Vicar of All Saint's, Ennismore Gardens, S.W., 1905-1907: Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, of Hertford College, Oxford, and of King's College Cambridge: Academic Committee of Royal Society of Literature: Gifford Lecturer, St.Andrews 1917-1918: Romanes and Hibbert Lecturer, 1920: Rede Lecturer, 1922: Huldean Lecturer, 1926: Honorary D. of Lit., Aberdeen 1920: Sheffield 1924: Honorary L.L.D. Edinburgh, 1923: Trustee of National Portrait Gallery, and since 1911 Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral. In line with this educational triumph, Harold Begbie in "Painted Windows" says, "There is no greater mind in the Church of England, no greater mind, I am disposed to think, in the English nation. His intellect has the range of an Acton, his forthrightness is the match of Dr. Johnson's, and his wit, less biting though little less courageous than Voltaire's, has the illuminating quality if not the divine playfulness of the wit of Socrates." 1. These are words of high praise yet they do not overstate the fact of the tremendous versatility and penetrative power of the mind of Dean Inge.

He says that the letter of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, offering him the Deanery of St. Paul's was a 'staggering surprise'. In his offer Mr. Asquith hoped that the new dean would revive the old traditions of the Deanery of St. Paul's 'as the most literary appointment in the Church of England!' I was to remember Milman, Mansel, and Church and to justify my appointment by taking a prominent part in the world of literature, scholarship, and theology." 2.

1. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.45.
2. Inge. Labels and Libels. p.257.

That the Dean of St. Paul's has justified this appointment is an unquestioned fact. He has proved to be a most prolific writer dealing with themes ranging from the popular to those requiring profound critical scholarship. The announcement of a new book by Dean Inge is a matter of international interest. An example of this interest came to the attention of the writer in connection with the Dean's book, published in America under the title, "Labels and Libels." This same book was published in England under the title "Assessments and Anticipations". In inquiring for the book under the English title the writer discovered, upon examining the table of contents, that the books differed in title only. This came as a surprise to the clerk in a popular bookstore in Boston, who, upon inquiry, found that only that morning they had received twenty copies of the English edition which were bought to sell at a price greatly in excess of that of the American publication. He explained the mistake as due the practice of the store which was to order immediately any book by Dean Inge. In the terms of a line of popular advertising, one is forced to say "Such popularity must be deserved".

The following works listed in the English edition of "Who's Who" 1930 furnish convincing evidence that Dean Inge has carried out the wishes of Prime Minister Asquith in the line of literary activity: Society in Rome Under the Caesars 1886. Eton Latin Grammar (with F.H.Rawlins) 1889. Third Edition 1900. Christian Mysticism, 1899. Two essays in Contentio Veritatis, 1902. Faith and Knowledge, 1904. Selections from German Mystics, 1904. Studies of English Mystics, 1906. Truth and Falsehood in Religion,

1906. Personal Idealism and Mysticism, 1907. Faith, 1909. Speculum Animae, 1911. The Church and the Age, 1912. Types of Christian Saintliness, 1915. The Philosophy of Plotinus, 1918. Outspoken Essays, 1919. Second Series, 1922. The Idea of Progress--Romanes Lecture - 1920. The Victorian Age (Rede Lecture) 1922. Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion, 1924. The Platonic Tradition, 1926. England, In Modern World Series, 1926. Lay Thoughts of a Dean, 1926. The Church and the World, 1927. Assessments and Anticipations, 1929, and some School Books. Here is a list of more than twenty-five publications from the pen of Dean Inge. Eleven of these were published before he came to St. Paul's. It will be recognized that his greatest work has been done since he came to the Deanery. His friend and fellow countryman, Harold Begbie, says that it was not until he came to St. Paul's that the world realized the greatness of his mind and the richness of his genius. 1.

The Dean's writings have a quality not usually met in modern writers who are widely read. There is always the evidence of careful scholarship. His sentences have a certain bristling quality that arouses the reader. He is sincere in his statements. Indeed this note of sincerity may be said to be characteristic of all his work. Here he is not unlike his patron saint, Plotinus, whose biographer says that he never wrote an insincere word. Another quality found in his work that is commendable, is that he never beclouds his position or his conclusion by meaningless sentences. In his study of Plotinus, for example, he reveals at

once that his position is that of a disciple and not that of a mere critic. His chief works are written almost wholly from the standpoint of Neoplatonism as exemplified in the works of Plotinus. There is another characteristic of the Dean's work that without doubt, accounts for his being so widely read and that is his courage. Every age needs men who, having thought things through, are willing to stand alone if need be, and declare what for them is the truth. There is no doubt as to the Dean of St. Paul's on this point. For example as already indicated, he takes his position in favor of Neoplatonism. He states his case as to the basic worth of Neoplatonic philosophy and faces the world. If the world agree with him so much the better, but if not he holds fast. The same is true with reference to Mysticism, to his strictures on democracy, to his disbelief in progress, to his belief in birth control, to his non-acceptance of the fundamentalist position, and likewise to his non-acceptance of the modernist view. He knows, and so does the world, where he stands upon the question of England bowing to the Pope. He has a view as to the theology of the church, and states it. The free churches, the high church, all come in for their part of commendation or censure. In his prognostications, he sees England no longer a nation of the first rank, but doomed to occupy a secondary place among the world powers. 1. This quality of mind reveals him to be thoroughly awake, and accounts somewhat for the sobriquet, "The Gloomy Dean" that, the writer thinks,

has not been wholly justified. In a fine paragraph, Harold Begbie, truly says, "Dr. Inge has thought things out; everything in his faith has been thought out; and the basis of all his thinking is acceptance of absolute values - absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty. No breath from class rooms agitated by Einstein can shake his faith in these absolutes. His spirit of the Universe is absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty. He is a Neoplatonist, but something more. He ascends into communion with this Universal Spirit whispering the Name of Christ, and by the powers of Christ in his soul addresses the Absolute as Abba, Father." Yet, and Begbie adds (and note its significance, "No man is freer of bigotry or intolerance, though not many can hate falsity and lies more earnestly." 1.

There is one quality in which the Dean's writings are seriously lacking, and that is the social note. He is undoubtedly an individualist. There is little evidence of great social passion. He has thought things through for himself and he is willing to let those who can, do the same. How strange it is to find a man of the Dean's breadth of intellect and power lacking in appreciation for the great principle of Democracy. He says, "Democracy in America means anything or nothing at all, which makes it an excellent slogan." 2. He makes the statement that the rich, never liked it or believed in it, that the middle class, would prefer almost any other form of government, that the laboring class used it as an instrument to destroy privilege, but is now thoroughly out of patience with it. 3. Of course, there is

1. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.37.
2. Inge. - Labels and Libels p.154.
3. " " " " p.154.

no denial that Democracy as we know it, has its faults but in the light of what history reveals with reference to other forms of government that have had much greater opportunity to justify themselves, one is justified in believing that the Dean is here speaking out of his prejudices.

In the same spirit he attacks Socialism, Labor Governments, Industrialists as the 'bete noire' of true government. Here of course, the Democratic principle is deeply involved and such movements are therefore especially offensive to the Dean. It would seem however to an unprejudiced observer that all of these movements, so common today, could not be dismissed with a word. While no one would be so foolish as to approve all the ideas or wild Utopian programs coming from these groups there are, without doubt underlying conditions that have brought these movements into being, conditions that at least demand sympathetic investigation. Someone has said of Tschaikowsky's music that the groans of the Russian peasants, suffering centuries of injustice run through it all. So it seems to the writer that these movements, wild and extreme as they are, nevertheless give expression however inarticulate that expression may be, to the fact of existing injustice in modern civilization that even a half-hearted Christianity would seek to overcome.

His lack in social passion may be accounted for when one considers his early life at Crayke. Social contacts were extremely few. Likewise one gets the impression that his life as a student did not tend to broaden his mind in this respect. At the best the scholar must be somewhat of a recluse. The same

may be said of his Highchurchmanship. There is another influence that is even stronger in determining his position here, and that is his Neoplatonic Philosophy. Here he found the hierarchical system of his church buttressed by a philosophy to which he seems even temperamentally disposed. 1. To be a Neoplatonist one must of necessity be a "lonely soul" making the steep ascent to the One. As Plotinus stated it, it is the flight of the lonely soul to the only God. As a disciple of Plotinus whose philosophy he sees at the basis of all mysticism, he naturally emphasizes the life of contemplation as the only true means of arriving at Reality. When one brings together the influences of early life, his devotion to scholarship, his Highchurchmanship, his Neoplatonic Philosophy, and his natural taciturnity heightened by partial deafness, this lack of social passion seems only natural.

It remains to be said, however, that whatever may be his weaknesses, however men may or may not agree with his position, he is bound to be regarded, and rightly, as one of the strongest men in his nation. Begbie gives it as his opinion that in the future men will regard the Dean as possessing something of the force, richness, and abiding strength commonly associated with Dr. Johnson. 2.

In philosophy he is a Neoplatonist, holding tenaciously to the position that there is something basic here. In religion he emphasizes the mystical. Mysticism he defines, as "The attempt to realize, in thought and feeling, the immanence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal."3. In

1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.II p.162-163
2. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.23
3. Inge - Christian Mysticism. p.5

politics he is a conservative, spurning Democracy. Indeed it appears from his writings that with little persuasion he would readily account for all the bad government on earth as due to Democracy. It may be that his disbelief in progress is due to the fact that this idea is too Democratic.

In appearance the Dean is a typical English Scholar and Divine. His pictures reveal him to be little different from such men as Doctor Moffatt and Canon Streeter. His friend Harold Begbie describes him thus: "He is very tall, rigid, long-necked, and extremely thin, with fine dark hair and a lean grey clean-shaven face, the heavy-lidded eyes of an almost Asian deadness, the upper lip projecting beyond the lower, a drift of careless hair sticking boyishly forward from the forehead, the nose is thin, the mouth mobile but decisive, the whole set and color of the face stonelike and impassive."¹.

One would not expect to find in the Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral any special emphasis that could be called humorous. It would seem that this position would bespeak only dignity and solemnity, and so it does. His writings cannot be said to have a very definitely humorous quality. Yet, in spite of his high position he seems to possess a certain quality of droll humor which from time to time comes to the surface in some sly comment or issues forth in some shrewd putting of a modern foible.

His friend, Harold Begbie, hints at a humorous quality when he says "When he smiles, it is as if a mischievous boy looked out of an undertaker's window; but the smile, so full of wit, mischief,

1. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.25.

and even gaiety, is gone in an instant."1. We are glad to close this sketch of the life of one of one of the world's most noted champion's of Neoplatonism with a touch that reveals that he may not be as cold as his impersonal philosophy might suggest. That there is a warm personal touch in his makeup is especially evident in his little book "Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion". However, he acknowledges that his Neoplatonic Philosophy does not lay much emphasis upon personal affection for man or for God.2.

1. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.25
2. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.II. p.162-163.

PART TWO

Dean Inge and His Exposition of Neoplatonism.

It is the plan of this paper to point out the marks of strength and the marks of weakness in Neoplatonism, following in particular, the exposition of Neoplatonism as given by Dean Inge in his two-volume work on Plotinus and in his other writings.

In his exposition of Neoplatonism the Dean of St. Paul's follows a plan that is highly commendable in that he does not seek to hide his own position. He states in the very outset that he approaches the task as an avowed disciple and not as mere student and critic. Some of our modern writers on philosophical subjects might greatly improve their work if they would follow such a course so that the reader might not be continually in the dark as to their own position. A striking example of this rather fruitless labor is seen in the work "The Story of Philosophy" by Durant. Here is a work that is greatly lacking in usefulness just because the author writes from no discernible philosophical standpoint.

In line with this principle, which seems to be one that has real value, the writer in such criticism that he may undertake, writes from the Personalistic standpoint.

In his introduction to his valuable work, "The Philosophy of Plotinus", the author reveals that his interest in Plotinus began while writing his Bampton Lectures on Christian Mysticism which he delivered at Oxford in 1899. This emphasis upon mysticism is manifest throughout the Dean's work and it is just here

it seems to me, that his chief interest in Plotinus centers. He says, "It soon became clear to me that mysticism involves a philosophy and at bottom is a philosophy."1. This mysticism he defines as, "a spiritual philosophy which demands the concurrent activity of thought, will, and feeling". 2. This activity of these elements of our personality leads to the goal which of course, is that man may become effectively a partaker of the Divine nature. It is significant that he quotes Plotinus to the effect that the power which leads us up to reality is one which all possess, though few use. It remains to be said however, that in actual experience Plotinus found that many are lacking in the power to use the power as is evidenced by the fact that he sought to found "Platonopolis" a community of choice spirits who might be able to "contemplate" and by "contemplation" arrive at the goal.

He makes short shrift, and rightly, of philosophies such as Pragmatism, and of theology such as is found in the NeoKantian Ritschl and his followers. He is right in his insistent emphasis that both the starting point and the goal for the Platonist is the question, 'What is ultimate reality?'3.

It is interesting to note that in his discussion of the speculative Mysticism of Spencer, Dean Inge says that Spencer's Absolute, matter without form, would seem to be identified with the all but non-existing "matter" of Plotinus, rather than with the superessential "One". "But later Neoplatonists found them-

1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I.p.4.
2. " " " " I p.5.
3. " " " " I p.4.

selves compelled to call both extremes *to h h 3/4*. Plotinus struggles hard against this conclusion, which threatens to make shipwreck of his Platonism."1. It is only fair to the Dean, however, in using this quotation to say that he repudiates his former judgments of Plotinus as being crude and not representing his mature opinions.2. These so-called, immature opinions come very near the truth so far as Plotinus' system is concerned. He does leave us with two extremes both of which are abstractions.

The author places great importance in the fact that Neoplatonism is the constructive effort of seven hundred years of unimpeded thinking, the longest the race has been permitted to enjoy. From this he concludes, and rightly, that Neoplatonism is of great importance in the history both of philosophy and of theology. There can be no doubt that the historical importance of Neoplatonism is very great. There is undoubted evidence of the influence of Neoplatonism in the writings of St. Paul and St. John. This influence he rightly concludes extends through Origen, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas and is a determining factor in traditional Christian theology. It does not seem necessary, however, to go to the extreme to which he goes in agreement with Troeltsch that "the future of Christian philosophy depends upon the renewal of its alliance with Neoplatonism."3. The author is right in his declaration that to study Christianity as a development from the Old Testament background, without recog-

1. Inge - Christian Mysticism. Note p.98.
2. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I, note p.1.
3. " " " " I, p.12.

nizing the Greek influence is to have a one-sided view of Christianity. He regards Christian Platonism as a continuation, under changed conditions, of the latest phase of Greek philosophy.

Dean Inge greatly deplores the lack of interest in Neoplatonism. He accounts for this lack of interest, especially in Plotinus, as due to the reluctance of churchmen to acknowledge obligations to a Pagan, who was master of the Anti-Christian apologist, Porphyry. Another reason is found in the difficulty of reading the Enneads in the original owing to obscurities of style and lack of arrangement, not to mention corruptions in the text.¹ The author is unwilling to acknowledge that there are inherent difficulties in the system which seem to me to be the real cause for lack of interest. It is difficult to see how this age of ours could ever become satisfied with a system that finds Unity, Reality, in ~~a mere~~ abstraction. Pragmatism itself is a direct reaction against the abstract conceptions of reality found in Hegel, and in Bradley. Philosophical systems that find their source of strength in well buttressed abstractions will hardly satisfy our age, notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of Dean Inge.

Among the many names given as speaking highly of the work of Plotinus, the author especially mentions Harnack, Caird, and Eucken. These men do speak highly of the work of Plotinus yet it is because of his historical importance rather than that they believe that his system is adequate. It is interesting to note

1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I.p.15.

that these men are among the foremost who charge Plotinus with metaphysical dualism. He is aware of this, however, and takes them seriously to task. He thinks that Eucken has not understood the doctrines of the One and the Spirit in relation to each other; that Caird distorted Plotinus in attempting to make him fit his Hegelian bed of Procrustes. Harnack, he charges with prejudice and with little knowledge of the Greeks. As to the specific charge of dualism I think that the author's point that the *Enneads* do not reveal Plotinus to have been a dualist is not strongly sustained. Harnack, however, especially, speaks of Neoplatonism as a whole, rather than confining himself to Plotinus. The author contends that later Neoplatonism was a corruption rather than a development of the system.¹

He places great confidence in the statement of Troeltsch to which he refers repeatedly: "In my opinion the sharper stress of the scientific and philosophical spirit in modern times has made the blend of Neoplatonism and New Testament Christianity the only possible solution of the problem at the present day, and I do not doubt that this synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity will once more be dominant in modern thought!" ². This word from Troeltsch is the best possible putting of the Dean's own position. He not only thinks that Plotinus will solve the great problems of the world, but private problems as well. He justifies his work on Plotinus, not on what others say but upon what Plotinus has done for him. "So it may be that others beside myself will find in this prophet of a sad time a helper in

1. *Philos.of Plotinus* Vol.I. p.19

2. Troeltsch quoted - *Philos.of Plotinus* Vol.1.p.22.

public and in private sorrows, and that they will say of Plotinus what he said of his master Ammonius, 'This is the man I was looking for'."1. Such statements from the Dean of St. Paul's reveal a genuine sincerity and personal interest in the work of Plotinus that is shared by very few. Indeed, this extreme position is a weakness that serves to render his work obscure. Sometimes it is difficult to discern whether he is expounding Plotinus' or his own views. Upon this point Harold Begbie says: "A friend of mine once asked him, 'Are you a Christian or a Neoplatonist?' He smiled. 'It would be difficult to say', he replied." 2.

As to his confidence in Neoplatonism and its ability to solve our problems, I must say that this is an optimism that I do not share. Harnack's position seems to be nearer the truth when he says, "Neoplatonism is, on the one side, the completion of ancient philosophy, and, on the other its abolition." 3. He shows that Neoplatonism from the standpoint of religion, rose to great heights, but in the end superstition overcame it with resulting barbarism. The testimony of history is difficult to gainsay, and I fear that any widespread return to a conception of reality so airy, with its resulting mysticism, would serve to make matters worse rather than better.

1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I, p.24.
2. Begbie - Painted Windows. p.32
3. Harnack - Hist. of Dogma Vol.I. p.336.

The Third Century.

Dean Inge takes the view that there was only one shining light in the third century and that was Plotinus. He says, "Plotinus is the one great genius in an age singularly barren of greatness." 1. He is equally sure that the Alexandrian philosophy of religion was the one great achievement of "still unexhausted richness." 2. He shows that this century was a period of religious revival. Oriental religions came from Egypt, Syria, Phrygia, and Palestine. From Egypt, the cult of Isis made great inroads; from Phrygia the worship of the Magna Mater; from Persia, came Mithraism with its influence upon Neoplatonism and Christianity; It was, likewise, a period of religious syncretism with the temples of the rival faiths standing side by side. While there did prevail a spirit of toleration, it was also a period of persecution. Bitter persecution against Christians and Jews arose under the leadership of Severus, Caracalla, and later under Decius. Neoplatonism, according to Dean Inge, exerted a tremendous and lasting influence over Christianity. This influence took the form of Christianity absorbing Neoplatonic principles. This enabled it to triumph over Neoplatonism. The inroads of these various faiths naturally made way for superstition, which according to the author, served to corrupt Neoplatonism. He seeks to bring out the point that later Neoplatonism is a corruption of the principles laid down by Plotinus. He says that the three protagonists, during this century were, Plotinus, Origen, and the successors of Valentinus;

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I. p.25.
2. " " " " I. p.70.

representing, respectively Greek philosophy, Hellenised Christianity, and Hellenised Orientalism. 1. It was this common debt to Greece that prevented the parties from being wholly alien to each other, and, hence, made religious Syncretism possible. He concludes, therefore, that the really great thing that came out of this century was the emergence of the religious philosophy of Plotinus with its consequent influence upon the religious thought of the whole world. He accepts Schmidt's summary of its characteristics: "'the union of philosophy and religion, a strong trend towards system and dogma, mistrust of arid intellectualism, consciousness of the need of revelation, aspirations after the spiritual life, thoughts of immortality, inwardness, purity, mysticism.'" 2.

We appreciate this effort of the author to give us a survey of the third century in order that we might the more completely understand the power and importance of Neoplatonism. His claim that Christianity cannot be adequately understood apart from an understanding of the influence of Neoplatonism is wholly right. Anyone who studies the work of Plotinus cannot deny that he rises to noble heights. Indeed it is significant, as Harnack points out that this philosophy, judged from the standpoint of religion and morality, sought to beget and confirm an ethical temper which was the highest and purest produced by the culture of the ancient world. 3. It is also significant that notwithstanding these words of high praise, Harnack considers Neoplatonism, as at the same time the completion and the abolition of ancient philosophy.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p.70.
2. " " " " I. p.70.
3. Harnack - Hist. of Dogma. Vol.I. p.336.

As to the utter barrenness of the third century aside from the name of Plotinus, one is inclined to think that the name of Origen is not to be classed among those of little influence. In many ways he proved himself to be as independent and as powerful in thinking and in influence as Plotinus.

Bigg, in his review of the third century, points out that the church in previous years had successfully met Gnosticism, Quartodecimanism, Montanism, and later Novatianism. In this century it wrestles with the problem of Unitarianism in the two forms, Theodotianism and Sabellianism, both of which were condemned with the result that it was emphatically declared that the Christian tradition taught a Trinity of Divine persons. He further mentions developments within the church that have had far reaching influence such as, severance between clergy and laity, celibacy of the clergy, further development of asceticism, and finally the struggle with superstition and magic. It is his contention that its compromise with superstition here finally led to the Reformation. 1. In view of the fact that the third century was a period of extreme persecution, it does not seem quite the whole truth to class it as barren in all except its development of Neoplatonism. I fear the author is neglecting some powerful factors. He neglects the emphasis noted by Harnack who holds, and I think rightly, that there developed forces that were too strong for Neoplatonism to survive. 2. I think, however, that Dean Inge has rendered a distinct service in his emphasis upon

1. Bigg. Origins of Christianity. Ch.38.p.494
2. Harnack - Hist. of Dogma. Vol.1.p.366.

the historical importance of the work of Plotinus. His purpose in showing the importance of Plotinus in the development of religious philosophy is indeed a worthy one. Surely it cannot be gainsaid that in Plotinus we find Greek philosophy becoming intensely religious. This does give Plotinus a secure place in history, although I fear that the author has overemphasized his importance as a philosopher for our day.

FORERUNNERS OF PLOTINUS.

Dean Inge emphasizes the point that there were no really great minds between Aristotle and Plotinus. Plotinus himself, continually goes back to Plato to whom alone he ascribes plenary inspiration. It is important to remember this in any attempt to understand Plotinus. It was not his purpose to go beyond Plato, although he does mark an advance. This fact of his allegiance to Plato is seen in repeated declarations that his doctrines are not original. The statement of his position with regard to the past is unique: "'This doctrine is not new; it was professed from the most ancient times, though without being developed explicitly. We wish only to be the interpreters of the ancients, and to show by the evidence of Plato himself that they had the same opinions as ourselves.'"1.

Among the forerunners of Plotinus, he lists the following: Plato, Neopythagoreanism, Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius, Numenius Ammonias Saccas, The Hermetic Writings, Philo, and The Gnostics. With such a formidable list of forerunners it is in-

1. Ennead 5.1.8. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I.p.110.

evitable that Plotinus should be called an eclectic. The Dean shows that some make this charge as a compliment as does Jules Simon who defines eclecticism to consist in harmonizing and combining the best of different schools. The term is used as a reproach in the sense that an eclectic philosopher has a patch-work mantle. He believes that Plotinus is not consciously an eclectic in either sense. He constantly goes back to Plato and would have been pleased with Augustine's word that 'in Plotinus, Plato lived again! His reverence for Plato is typical of his spirit towards the past. He appealed to Plato, refusing to be called an Academic, and likewise was reluctant to point out errors in other 'ancient philosophers of blessed memory." 1.

From other philosophers he shows that Plotinus obtained much for which little or no acknowledgment is made. He accounts for this on the basis that it is due to the interchange of ideas between the Academy and the Peripatetics before Plotinus, to his jealousy of the Athenian School. He admits little from the Pythagoreans that had not been admitted by Plato. From the Stoics he received much although he was openly hostile to them. The author notes that the so called dynamic pantheism as charged by Zeller and others, the doctrine that living forces of the Deity permeate nature, is Stoical. This doctrine he repudiates, so far as Plotinus is concerned, on the ground that for Plotinus the world is immanent in God, not God in the world. 2. From the Stoics he obtained his idea that Matter, so far as it exists is

1. Enn.3.7.1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I p.109.

2. Note Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I, p.112.

created by God and from them he obtained the terms *λόγος* and *πνεῦμα*. Likewise he is indebted to the Stoics for his ethics as manifested in indifference to external interests and emphasis upon the subjective condition of the individual. His opposition to Stoicism and kindred theories is explained in the Fourth Ennead in which he says that 'it is a radical mistake to explain the higher by the lower and that the merely potential can of itself develop actuality.' 1.

He attempts to explain away the influence of the sceptical developments of Platonism upon Plotinus. He acknowledges a sceptical element in Plotinus but likens it to what he calls 'the so-called scepticism of Bradley. He approves Höfdding's statement that scepticism is not Bradley's point of view but that he should be called a mystic. "Our thought is always aspiring to something which is more than thought, our personality to something more than personality, our morality to something higher than all morals." 2. The author considers this position of Bradley and likewise of Plotinus, as partly justifying scepticism since we recognize the inadequacy of every synthesis except the last. Scepticism according to this system is not used to destroy absolutism, but to establish it. The author clearly reveals his own position in favoring such abstractions as portrayed by Plotinus and Bradley. This conception of the Absolute as beyond all relations, beyond thought, beyond being is an inherent defect that cannot be overcome and surely prophesies shipwreck for his hopes that Neoplatonism will prove to be an adequate philosophy for our times.

1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I.p.113.
2. Höfdding. Modern Philosophers Quoted.
Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I.p.114.

THE WORLD OF SENSE.

He shows that Plotinus is influenced by the triadic schematism common to the Greeks. The number-mysticism of the Pythagoreans influenced all Greek speculation. For Plotinus there were two fundamental triads; first, the Trinity of Divine Principles -- the Absolute, Spirit, and Soul; second, the tripartite division of man into Spirit, Soul, and Body. He realizes, however, that Plotinus is not dominated by the triad as is the thought of Proclus and Hegel. The author explains again and again, that the world of sense for Plotinus, is not the world described by natural science. He holds that the key to an understanding of his philosophy is that Neoplatonism deals with spiritual, non-quantitative relations, and that the Platonic doctrine of 'participation' is an attempt to express symbolically the interpenetration of all spiritual existences in an ordered hierarchy'. 1. For Plotinus, Body, Soul and Spirit, in their objective aspect, are understood as standing in an ordered hierarchy. Body corresponds to the world as seen by the senses; Soul to the world as interpreted by mind as a spatial and temporal order; Spirit to the spiritual world. These three aspects of the world are perceived, respectively, by the bodily senses, discursive thought, and spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge. Plotinus considers this latter faculty as the highest faculty of our nature. Only as we exercise this power do we see the world as it really is, and only as we exercise this power, ' a power which all possess but few use' are we real and in contact with reality. "This reality,"

1. Philos. of Plotinus Vol.I. p.123.

the author says, "is neither an independently existing external universe, nor a subjective construction thrown off by the mind. It is constituted by the unity in duality of the spiritual faculty and the spiritual world which it 'beholds' in exercising its consciousness. Spirit and spiritual world imply and involve each other; neither has any existence apart from its correlative. If we call the spiritual world the self-externalization of Spirit, we must add that with equal propriety Spirit may be called the self-consciousness of the spiritual world.¹ This exposition of Plotinus' position is directly in accordance with his conception of an ordered hierarchy in his thought of reality. This leads logically to his position that the spiritual world alone possesses reality while the phenomenal world is only an appearance. This thought developed by Plotinus is one of his greatest contributions. His theory leads to the conception of ^a world of phenomena as over against a world of reality. While Plotinus leads the way to a better conception of the material world, his own theory of an ordered hierarchy leading finally to matter which he considers as not possessing reality, is not altogether satisfactory. His conception of an ordered hierarchy resolves itself finally into a system that does leave us with an abstraction, the Absolute, on the one hand, and with another abstraction, Matter, on the other. According to Plotinus' exposition, the Absolute is beyond being, beyond existence, and Matter is 'not being' outside of being, thus possessing many of the very qualities of the Absolute. This position of Plotinus does help us to a more thorough view of the phenomenality of matter but nevertheless, there is an insupera-

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I, p.124.

ble difficulty in his theory of the Absolute as over against this theory of matter. This tendency to become a prey to mere abstractions runs through Plotinus' whole system. In his view the lower grade of being becomes Matter of the one that immediately precedes it, this grade in turn becomes Matter to the one immediately preceding it until we reach the Absolute; this Absolute transcends being, thought, existence. In his exposition of this point the author says, "Every grade of being performs its highest act in becoming the Matter of the grade above it. Thus the all-but non-existent Matter at the bottom of the scale is redeemed in giving itself as the recipient of Form. In so doing, it is an image of the great self-surrender whereby the World-Soul receives illumination from Spirit, and of the ineffable self-surrender by which Spirit itself awaits the visitation of the Absolute Godhead." 1. It may readily be seen from this statement that each grade of being is supposed to be passively receiving what is given by the grade of being above it. It specifically surrenders all activity, swooning in succession into the grade above until the final grade swoons into the Absolute. It is just here that the author argues against the Personalistic position. In accordance with Plotinus' theory he holds that self-consciousness and self-control must be surrendered. This is clearly indicated in his discussion of the modern conception of personality, which he blames Kant for introducing. He holds that the goal in Neoplatonism is the unification of the personality and

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I. p.143.

that the clinging taint of selfishness and self-consciousness is the obstacle to its achievement.¹ He plays upon the words selfishness and self-consciousness as though they were one and the same. He holds that the artist does his best work only when he is rid of self-consciousness. This, it may readily be seen, is merely playing with terms. The artist does lose self-consciousness of the type seen in the overgrown sixteen-year-old boy. But this is not what Personalism means by self-consciousness. The type of self-consciousness emphasized by Personalism is that which enables the artist, after losing himself in his work, to know and realize fully that the work is his own. The complete loss of self-consciousness that he seems to be imagining would not result in achieving a masterpiece, nor would the artist recognize his work if he did. It seems strange that the author repudiates the criticism of Zeller and Schwegler who hold that Plotinus finally swoons into the Absolute, yet he argues for just that type of experience.

CREATION OF MATTER.

The author holds that Plotinus' view has its foundation in Plato in the *Timaeus*, 29, 30 to the effect that God brought order out of disorder by 'putting Spirit in Soul and Soul in Body'. This leads to his conclusion that the universe is a living creature endowed with Soul and Spirit by the providence of God. Plato's view is open to the criticism that God's intervention in reducing irregular and disorderly motion to harmony, must be a motion of something. He notes that Eckhart faced the same difficulty in

1. Inge. *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*. p.103.

holding that there was no Matter before creation but only 'indetermination', chaos not being created by God. This led to the hypothesis that some other creative agent accounted for chaos. Plotinus repudiates this dualism. In Ennead 1.8.14 he makes the statement that Soul could not have 'come', if Matter had not been there already. The author says that the charge by Chaignet that Plotinus contradicts himself here is true only if his statement about Time is taken literally. He says that neither here nor in the statement in Ennead 2.4.8. 'efficient cause must precede Matter', is his statement about time to be taken literally.¹ It is his belief that Plotinus follows Plato in holding the world to be eternal and that he failed to clarify Plato's obscurity here owing to his reverence for his mater. He sees that there are difficulties in the doctrine of an eternal creation especially in the light of Plotinus' theory that the higher principle is before the lower. The difficulty he recognizes is that the higher principle cannot begin to mold the lower unless it finds something to work upon. ² It does not seem to me that the author is able to explain away the obscurity here. It is on this basis that Harnack charges Plotinus with metaphysical dualism.

Schwegler explains Plotinus' conception of matter on the basis of his theory of emanation which assumes that the remoter emanation possesses even a lower degree of perfection than that which precedes it; and represents consequently the totality of existence as a descending series. Thus we finally reach matter, the indefinite, non-being which is the last and lowest of emana-

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.145.
2. " " " " I.p.145.

tions. 1. Rogers likewise emphasizes this conception of Matter as mere not-being, a negative limit to reality. He criticizes Neoplatonism in its attempt to solve the problem of the relation of the world to God by its theory of a graduated scale of existence whereby the gap is bridged over by a series of smaller differences. This he says that Neoplatonism considers the material world as lowest of all, 'an image, the shadow of a shadow, where the negative element, not being, reaches its maximum.' Of this theory he says, "If all distinctions are essentially unreal, and the sole reality is the One, unknowable and unapproachable, cloaked in ineffable nothingness, do we not seem by one stroke to have blotted out the whole universe of our experience as less than even a dream?" He concludes that there is a dualism here that Neoplatonism cannot reconcile with its conception of the One. 2.

It is clear that these discussions bring out the point that matter presented a problem for Plotinus that he had difficulty in solving. This problem was no less troublesome for Plato, a fact which the author recognizes when he seeks to account for the unsatisfactory element in the conception of the Platonists as due to their reverence for Plato. 3. It seems that Dean Inge is near the truth when he says of the Neoplatonic theory of Matter, "Soulless matter which exists as a logical abstraction, is arrived at by looking at things 'in disconnection, dull and spiritless'. It is the sphere of the 'merely many', and is zero, as the One who is not is Infinity." 4. It is only fair to the author to point out again that he has repudiated his earlier statements on Neoplatonism. 5.

1. Schwegler. Hist. of Philosophy. p.141.
2. Rogers. Student's Hist. of Philos. p.178-180.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p.149
4. Inge. Christian Mysticism. p.95.
5. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. I. p.1. Note.

However the fact remains that the One at the one extreme and Matter at the other in Plotinus' theory appear to be abstractions. His theory of a graduated hierarchy from the One to Matter does not help him solve the problem for as Rogers points out the 'not being' however attenuated as over against the One is still a stubborn fact. 1.

The author gives a survey of the traditional Christian doctrine, creation out of nothing. He says that this does not mean that God took some nothing and made a world. Augustine's position is that God made the world because he wished to make it. "When we say He made it out of nothing, we mean that there was no preexistent Matter, unmade by Himself, without which He could not have made the world." 2. He held that the world was created not in Time, but with Time.

Aquinas' held that 'creation is a production of a thing according to its whole substance, nothing being presupposed, whether created or uncreated. Origen taught that the world did not begin in time and held to a series of worlds succeeding each other without beginning or end. Scotus Erigena, as the author notes, comes nearest to the view of Plotinus. He makes creation co-eternal with God, who is prior to the world only as its cause.' When we hear it said that God makes all things, we ought to understand simply that God is in all things; that is, that He subsists as the Being of all things. 3. He points out that Hegel's idea that it belongs to the essence of God to create is not Plotinus' view, in that Hegel's view in a sense subordinates God to the category of Time.

1. Rogers. Student's Hist.of Philosophy p.179
2. Augustine. Ad Orosium 1-2. Quoted Philos.of Plotinus. Vol I.p.145.
3. Scotus Erigena Quoted Philos.cf Plotinus. Vol.I.p.146.

The value in Plotinus' view, the author thinks, is that he gives us a refutation of materialism. I think that this is true. He does lead toward the conclusion that Matter is phenomenal. However, the fact remains that he never could quite solve the difficulty in that he conceived Matter as evil. Dean Inge charges that Platonic schools were not thoroughly honest in dealing with this problem. He holds that some Platonists and Pythagoreans 'taught as a popular doctrine, a metaphysical dualism which they did not themselves believe.' It is his opinion that this doctrine was retained in popular lecturing, as he says, "not so much from want of candor, but from reverence for Plato, who in some of his most eloquent passages had described the heavy weight which lies upon the Soul while it is enclosed in this muddy vesture of decay."

1. He explains the dualism in Philo and Plutarch as due to the fact that they associated evil with Matter, not because it is corporeal but because it is in a state of flux and change. This, he holds, is the key to much that is hard to understand in Platonism. He says, "For a Greek, the nature of God means, specifically, immortality. The gods are deathless and changeless; the greatest of evils in this world is that all things change, decay and die...The body is a dead weight, not because it is material, but because it is perishable. 2. He believes that these writers saw clearer than Plotinus that the soul can fight its battles only on its own ground. They saw that the enemies of the soul must be psychic which Plotinus did not. 3.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.149.
2. " " " " I.p.149
3. " " " " I.p.150.

SPACE AND TIME.

The author quotes at length from Professor Taylor's "Elements of Metaphysics" to prove that neither space nor time can be more than an appearance of reality. He makes a distinction between what he calls perceptual and conceptual space. Both perceptual space and time are what they are because seen from the standpoint of our finitude. Conceptual space and time he holds, are constructed by deliberate abstraction from the relation to immediate experience implied in individuality. Since neither perceptual space and time, nor conceptual space and time gives a point of view, both individual and infinite, neither can be the point of view of an infinite experience." An absolute experience must be out of time and out of space, in the sense that its contents are not apprehended in the form of the spatial and temporal series, but is some other way. Space and time then must be the phenomenal appearance of a higher reality which is spaceless and timeless." 1.

Dean Inge is inclined to believe that the distinction between perceptual and conceptual space is somewhat overemphasized by this argument but he concludes that the result of this maturer analysis is the same as is found in the Enneads. Here space is only appearance but it is the appearance of the reality that is yonder. He says that the belief that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made' is fundamental for Platonism. "Space is after everything else", the lowest rung of the ladder. It is inferior to Time; for while Space furnishes the stage and scenery of the world-drama, Time gives us the play itself." 2.

1. Taylor. Elements of Metaphysics quoted in Philos.
of Plotinus. Vol.I. p.165.
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I. p.168.

The author explains that Plotinus was aware of the difficulties in the problem of Time. His plan was to try to understand it from a study of the "blessed ancients". The real problem in Time is evident when we seek to analyze it. He quotes Augustine who says "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not." 1. Plato's definition of time 'as the moving image of eternity' which it resembles as much as it can, is given with the interpretation of some of the Pythagoreans who identify Eternity with the spiritual world and Time with the phenomenal world. This he holds must not be done, for the spiritual world contains particular things as parts of itself, while Eternity contains them as a unified whole -- it contains them as they are sub specie aeternitatis. 2.

He shows that Plotinus examines the view of the Stoics who identify Time with motion and that this view is rejected on the grounds that if Time and motion were the same there would be many times. The theory of Time attributed to Erastosthenes and Hestiaeus of Perinthus, that Time is 'that which is moved' is rejected. The view of Zeno that Time is 'the interval of motion' is rejected for the reason that intervals are not uniform. This would result as before in many times, besides interval is not a temporal expression. Aristotle's view of Time as 'the number and measure of motion' is rejected because of the difficulty of the irregularity of motion which would necessitate many times.

1. Augustine Confessions Quoted Bk.XI.14.-

Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.169. Note.
2. " " " " Vol.I.p.169.

The author quotes Plotinus to the effect that what the Aristotelians ought to have said, and probably meant, was that Time is measured by motion. The Epicurean theory that time is an accident or consequence of motion is rejected as no explanation at all. 1.

The constructive part of Plotinus' teaching with regard to Time.

For Plotinus, Time is one of the given facts of experience. As to its origin, Dean Inge says that he half banteringly suggests a mythological explanation. His view is that 'Time, still non-existent, reposed in the bosom of Reality, until Nature, wishing to become its own mistress and to enter into possession of itself, and to enlarge the sphere of its activities, put itself and Time together with itself, into motion' "Thus", says the author, "Time the image of Eternity, arose through the desire of the Soul of the World to exert its active powers." Time is the form which the Soul creates for itself when it desires to reproduce the eternal ideas as living and creative activities. It is the life of the Soul as it moves from one manifestation of life to another! ... Time is the activity of an eternal Soul, not turned towards itself nor within itself, but exercised in creation and generation." 2

The author recognizes that Plotinus' view of Time anticipates some of the best modern thought. He notes that Plotinus' view has points of similarity with Bergson's doctrine of *la durée*. He criticizes Bergson, however, on the ground that his view is one sided, in that he regards the past as flowing into the present and modifying it, while he does not regard the future as affecting the

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.169.

2. " " " Vol.I.p.172-173.

present. "The future appears to be non-existent for Bergson, though the past exists." 1. He likewise criticizes Bergson in his conception of Space as over against Time. He shows that Bergson differs from Plotinus in making space prior to the objects which it contains. This view of space he calls "a very vulnerable spot in his philosophy." 2.

For Plotinus Time is the form of willed change! Every distinct idea yonder becomes a finite purpose here. Every attribute of God's essence becomes an activity of His existence. The time-process is not the necessary form of the self-evolution of God; it is the product of His free but necessary creative activity." 3. He holds that for Plotinus Time is a teleological category. "It is the measure of a definite finite activity directed to some end beyond itself." 4.

It will be seen that this exposition of Plotinus' view of time reveals that Plotinus is closely allied with Plato, his master, who regarded time as 'the moving image of eternity!' Augustine likewise held that 'God made the world not in time but with time'. Time for Plotinus is likewise closely related to creation. According to Dean Inge's exposition, 'Time is the activity of an eternal soul, exercised in creation.' He sees that in Plotinus' view 'Soul is the creator of the phenomenal world and the time process, and that this creation is a continuous act, being the activity which constitutes the out-going life of the Soul!' 5.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.175.
2. " " " " I.p.176.
3. " " " " I.p.182.
4. " " " " I.p.183.
5. " " " " I.p.185.

He notes that in past and future from the human point of view, there is a real generic difference. "The will, of which Time is the form, has a wholly different relation to the future from that which it has to the past. In looking back, the will confesses its impotence; in looking forward it finds its scope and *raison d'etre*. It is because psychical reality is will, not memory, that we regard the past as 'done with'. Memory indeed proves that our consciousness of a moving present, perpetually passing out of existence, is an illusion." 1.

Time for Plotinus is not ontologically real. In Spirit the time relation is transcended. He explains that in Plotinus' conception of the outgoing life of the Soul resulting in the creation of the phenomenal world and the time-process, the Soul has 'come down' on a temporary adventure. This time-process is thus transcended when the Soul returns by contemplation of Spirit. "The Soul must take its Time-experience up with it to the threshold of Eternity; it will leave nothing behind as it crosses the threshold." 2.

The criticism that must be directed to this exposition is that which applies to Neoplatonism in general. The hierarchical conception of reality is shot through with abstractions. The time-process is transcended only by a process of contemplation which ends, in this upward climb from the world of sense, in the usual Neoplatonic abstraction. The Personalistic position with regard to the complete ideality of space and time seems to me to be worked out along much sounder lines. The conception of Reality as

1. Philos. of Plotinus, Vol.I.p.185.
2. " " " " I.p.186.

personal is the foundation that gives one a vantage point in considering such difficult problems as change and identity, time and eternity. What Personalism explains on the basis of a more complete understanding of Personality, Neoplatonism seeks to arrive at on the basis of contemplation and abstraction.

THE SOUL AND ITS IMMORTALITY.

The author traces the various conceptions of the soul as held by thinkers preceding Plotinus. He explains that the early idea of the soul probably had its source in animism. Empedocles holds the Soul to be compounded of all elements each of which has a soul. Plato constructs Soul out of the elements. Democritus identifies Soul and Mind. Anaxagoras identifies Soul and Mind, making Mind the principle of all things. Heracleitus identifies Soul with the 'fiery process' source of other existing things, least corporeal and in constant movement. The Orphics taught that the Soul is fallen, a wanderer until the end of the cosmic year. The significant thing in their doctrine is that the Soul retains its individuality through all transmigrations. The Pythagoreans held to the doctrine of a multitude of immortal souls thus breaking up the older idea that 'Soul' generically is the active power or manifestation of one spiritual being. The author explains that Aristotle recognized two theories of the Soul in early philosophy. Those who centered on the animate as that which moves, regard soul as that which is most capable of movement; and those who center on the fact that the Soul knows and perceives, identify Soul with the elementary principles of

all existence. 1.

He conceives Plotinus' position to be that of one who is attempting a syncretism of two different views. One that identifies Soul with Mind or Spirit and the other that thought of many Souls. One of the most significant points is that Plotinus held that the Soul stands midway between the phenomenal world and the world of Spirit. Thus he believes in the immateriality of the Soul. Soul he regards as the offspring of Spirit, the energy thrown off by Spirit, an image of Spirit. "Soul is still a part of the Divine world, though the lowest part. ' It is not Matter and Form, but Form only, and power and energy second to that of Spirit. Soul is eternal and timeless. It may be compared to a moving circle round the One, while Spirit is an unmoving circle. Soul is 'indivisible even when it is divided; for it is all in all and all in every part.... Soul is distinguished from Spirit by the presence of unfulfilled desire in Soul, Spirit being free from all desires. Soul as an activity proceeding from Spirit, is in labor to create after the pattern which it saw in Spirit, and from this desire 'the whole world that we know arose and took its shapes! " 2.

Dr. Knudson sees in Plotinus' work many statements which anticipate the modern personalistic conception of the self. This is one of Plotinus' great contributions. Personalism makes this conception of the self central, as the key to ultimate reality. Plotinus did not develop the metaphysical significance of the Soul's synthesis of unity and plurality, although he did give to the Soul a certain pre-eminence. His doctrine of emanation, in

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.201.
2. " " " " I.p.204.

which he conceives of each succeeding grade of reality as emanating from the grade immediately preceding, necessarily involved him in difficulties that all his power to paint pictures could not overcome. In his conception of reality which he finds in the One he becomes a prey to abstractions throughout his entire system. "Unity, intelligence, and the soul -- the Neoplatonic trinity -- are not distinct or independent realities, as Plotinus held. They are simply abstractions from the unitary and conscious life of the self. And the self, too, is not a compound of consciousness and life. Its life, as a matter of fact, is its consciousness, and its consciousness is its life; and only in its living consciousness do we have true reality."¹. This failure of the advocates of Neoplatonism to understand that abstract conceptions of reality cannot satisfy the demands of reason is the surest proof that their hopes that Neoplatonism will become the prevailing philosophy can never be realized.

In his doctrine of the World-Soul the author brings out the thought that Plotinus held that the world is in the World-Soul rather than that the World-Soul is in the world. This World-Soul, the third Person in the Neoplatonic Trinity, he holds is very near to Spirit. The World-Soul is creator and providence of the world. He notes that Plotinus differs from Plato here in that he goes beyond Plato who allowed souls to animals, in allowing souls to vegetables and minerals. He says that Plotinus is in agreement with Leibnitz and Fechner in allowing that the heavenly bodies have life or soul. He upholds Plotinus' thought that there are many things in the universe more Divine than man. He prefers

1. Dr. Knudson, *Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 243.

Plotinus' view here to what he considers the absurd doctrines of Hegel and Wallace. He accuses Hegel of making this earth the center of the Universe, and Germany the hub of the planet. 1.

In his doctrine of individual souls, the author develops the idea that Plotinus argues against such monists as Heracleitus, the Stoics and some Neopythagoreans. He holds that individual souls are 'Logoi of Spirits, corresponding to distinct Spirits yonder.' He shows, however, that Plotinus regards the division of souls from each other as the affection of bodies. While the body makes these divisions he nevertheless holds that in the spiritual world they are one. "All souls are one. The Soul is the sphere of the One-and Many as the Spirit is the sphere of the One-Many. That is to say, individuality is a fact, but sympathy is also a fact, which bears witness to a real unity behind the apparent separateness. 2. This is the quality of the soul that Personalism seizes upon as the center of its system. This fact of the soul's synthesis of unity and plurality which is given in experience is made basic as the key to ultimate reality. Neoplatonism however, emphasizes pure unity in the One as the highest reality and seeks to transcend this Many-and One relationship as having no place in this transcendent Unity. Herein again is the characteristic weakness of Plotinus' system, that he prefers a unity that is an abstraction rather than a unity in diversity on the basis of free personality.

Schwegler in his History of Philosophy attacks the system of Plotinus on the basis that the ultimate end of individual souls is unconscious absorption--disappearance--in God. He argues that

1. Philos.of Plotinus.Vol.I.p.211.
2. " " " " I.p.214.

in finding the highest principle, not through self-consciousness and natural rational explanation, but only through ecstasy, mystic annihilation of self, it is the overleaping of all philosophy, and the destruction of ancient philosophy. He maintains that this mystic absorption into the One, this trance or swooning into the absolute, is a characteristic of Neoplatonism that is opposed to the Greek philosophical systems proper. 1. Dean Inge attempts to answer this question as to the absorption of the soul or self in the absolute. He notes the difficulties in the question which he believes involves the question of personality, human and divine. He states Lotze's conclusion that we have little ground to speak of finite personality, and that personality is an ideal proper only to the infinite in unconditioned nature. 2. Another view is that personality is the name for our delimitation of individual existence. He quotes Wallace to the effect that personality exists only because we are not pure spirits. His conclusion is that personality is a limitation because it involves relations to others and hence cannot be applied to Deity. 3. Self consciousness and self-direction regarded by Personalism as distinguishing marks of personality, Neoplatonism treats very unsatisfactorily. Self-consciousness is not regarded as an ultimate state of the human spirit. 4. The Dean of St. Paul's argues that our best work is done when we leave self-consciousness behind. 5. This is but juggling with the terms for the fact that we still remember that it is 'our work' is proof enough that self-consciousness in the personalistic sense, has not been left behind.

1. Schwegler. Hist.Philos. p.140,143.
2. Philos.of Plotinus.Vol.I.p.249-50
3. " " " " I.p.250
4. " " " " I.p.238.
5. " " " " I.p.238.

That Neoplatonism refuses to ascribe primary importance to human consciousness, he regards as one of the strong points in its favor for thereby it is in sympathy with mysticism. It seems that this position makes Schwegler's criticism of Neoplatonism difficult to gainsay. If we reach reality only through a mystic swoon into the absolute it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than the one Schwegler comes to with regard to Neoplatonism overleaping all philosophy. 1. In this same connection it is the conclusion of Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy that the Alexandrians exaggerated the tendency of the Cynics and Stoics to despise humanity. He accounts for Plotinus being ashamed of his body on the basis of his contempt for human personality. He develops the idea that Plotinus seized upon ecstasy as the faculty by which the mind divests itself of its personality. In ecstasy the soul is separated from body, is separated from individual consciousness and finally becomes absorbed in the Infinite Intelligence from which it emanated. He accounts for Plotinus' enthusiasm for ecstasy on the basis of his desire to get rid of personality. On the basis of the identity of subject and object, of thought and thing, without which he holds Neoplatonism is a blank, personality is absorbed. "As soon as I comprehend the Infinite, I am Infinite myself; that is to say, I am no longer myself, no longer that finite being having a consciousness of his own separate existence. If therefore, I attain to a knowledge of the Infinite, it is not by my Reason, which is finite and embraces finite objects only, but by some higher faculty, a faculty altogether impersonal, which identifies itself with its object." 2.

1. Schwegler. Hist.of Philos. p.143.

2. Plotinus Enn.5.5.10. Lewes Biographical Hist.of Philosophy Vol.I.p.314-316.

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The author lists the following faculties of the soul in Plotinus' system; sensation, memory, imagination, opinion, and reason. Reason he regards as the proper activity of the Soul in which it discharges its chief function. 1.

In the discussion of the descent of the Soul, he emphasizes the point that Plotinus is perplexed. The views not all of which are consistent are that souls were created and sent into the world that they might be molded a little nearer to the Divine image by yearning for the home which they have left. Thus the soul descends not of its own choice. Plotinus turns to Plato who regards the soul as moulting its wing feathers on coming in contact with matter. 2. Plotinus does not wholly agree with Plato in disparaging the world, holding that we may care for the lower without ceasing to abide in the highest and best. 3. It seems to be the center of Plotinus' view that the Universal Soul and individual souls are necessarily sent here as representations of the world of Spirit. His frequent use of the saying 'There is nothing Yonder that is not also Here' is typical of his viewpoint. Yet, Plotinus held that the soul is guilty on two counts, one in coming down and the other in entering into bodies. He also develops the idea that the soul gains a knowledge of good and evil in coming down, and is not hurt provided it returns quickly. Porphyry further develops this idea that this knowledge of evil is gained for the purpose of being liberated from any desire for it. Plotinus, however, seems to sense the danger that the soul should become so enamoured with sensuous things that it should forget its source. The emphasis here is that the soul is a spiritual being and must

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.221.
2. " " " " I.p.256.
3. " " " " I.p.259.

not forget its connection with the spiritual world. 1.

To the question, Does the soul all descend? Plotinus gives a negative answer. He holds that there is a nucleus that does not consent to evil. In this he is not followed by his successors. Iamblichus held that there is no pure soul that remains sinless while the 'composite nature' goes astray. "For 'if the will sins how can the soul be sinless'." 2. Proclus holds that the soul descends because it wishes to imitate the providence of the gods. Thus the author concludes there is no contamination so long as the soul remembers that it has been sent as God's fellow-worker. As to Plotinus' view that the soul does not all descend, Dean Inge makes the interesting observation that there are many persons of whom we may say that the soul does not seem to have 'come down' entire. On the basis of this problem which proved perplexing to Plotinus, we may say that the perplexity remains. There seems to be a certain prodigality on the part of the Infinite with regard to both the physical world and the world of human life that must forever prove baffling. We may be able to account for the existence of a few choice souls but when we consider much in our own lives and the lives of the great masses of men who have been, are now, or ever shall be, we join in hoping with Dean Inge that in another life the soul may be able to act more freely.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.I.p.252,254,257.

2. " " " Vol.I.p.262.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

Plotinus' idea as to immortality of the soul as developed by Dean Inge is one of the least rewarding parts of his exposition. He surveys the development of the idea of immortality and finds, as do Salmond and Pringle-Pattison, that among the Greeks the doctrine belonged to Orphic tradition. The prevailing idea among the Greeks was that only the gods enjoyed the prerogative of deathlessness. 1. He traces the various ideas and arguments advanced by Plato and comes to the general conclusion that his writings reveal no fixed and definite conviction. 2. This general conclusion is shared by Galloway in his book, "The Idea of Immortality" and by Pringle-Pattison in his book with the same title. The principal ideas developed by Plato as treated by Dean Inge are as follows: In the *Phaedo* the argument is based on the belief that the theory of Ideas and the doctrine of immortality, stand or fall together. In the *Apology* no one knows but he hopes the good man will find more congenial company. In the *Meno*, immortality is a beautiful tale of priests and poets, but says also that if the truth of real being is in the soul it must be immortal. In the *Phaedo* he uses the doctrine of reminiscence to establish pre-existence, inferring that souls remain unchanged through successive incarnations. Next he uses the argument that the soul is the idea of life and is alien to death. He points out that this is the familiar fallacy of the old ontological proof. Pringle-Pattison adds that in the *Phaedo* Plato bases his argument for immortality on the theory that everything which has an opposite is

1. *Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.3.*
2. " " " " " II.p.10

generated only from that opposite. Hence, as life and death are opposites they are generated one from the other. This argument is based upon the idea of a limited supply of souls. As to the cogency of the argument Pringle-Pattison says that it would be possible to prove on the same principles a perpetual alternation between drunk and sober. 1. In the Republic and the Phaedrus he argues that the soul has indestructible life in its own right. There is another argument that Plato uses in the Republic which both Galloway and Pringle-Pattison mention and that is that of justice or that immortality rests upon the thought of the goodness of God. The following passage from the Republic seems clear: "Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the Gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as a man can attain his likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?"

"Yes, he said; "if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him." 2.

While this belief of Plato is grounded in his theology it seems very doubtful if we shall find a surer foundation even for our own belief than in the goodness of God.

Another argument advanced in the Timaeus is that the higher part of Souls is the direct work of the Divine intelligence. God cannot wish to destroy His own work and nothing else can destroy it. Souls are immortal because made in the image of God. The author

1. Pringle-Pattison. Idea of Immortality. p.44.

2. Republic 613. Jowett's translation Vol.2.p.444.

concludes that on the basis of this argument there is doubt as to how much of what we consider our souls is really immortal. 1.

Aristotle's position is that the higher soul or impersonal Nous is immortal but that the hopes for the individual are very doubtful. Soul, for Aristotle, Pringle-Pattison holds, is functioning of the body. This is true throughout the lower ranges of the soul-experience, but Nous, the higher intelligence, being in its essential nature an activity 'would seem to be developed in us as a self-existent substance and to be imperishable'. This conception of Nous, Pringle-Pattison points out, led Aristotle to the conclusion that individual immortality is impossible. 2. Both Inge and Pringle-Pattison conclude that Aristotle's conception of Soul would seem to preclude the possibility of individual immortality. 3.

The Stoics held that the destiny of the Soul is to be reabsorbed into the primal essence. This is based upon their doctrine that nothing ever really perishes, hence the soul is immortal. The Epicureans denied immortality altogether. 4. It seems that this Stoic doctrine is one that comes very near the Neoplatonic conception of immortality especially in the light of his mystical conception of absorption into the Absolute. He speaks of the mystical experience as being absorbed in God. "Absorbed in God he makes but one with Him, like a center of a circle coinciding with another center." 5.

The following points are at the center of Plotinus' teaching

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.8-10.
2. Pringle-Pattison. Idea of Immortality. p.68.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.11.
4. " " " " II.p.12.
5. Plotinus quoted by Tennant. Philosophical Theology.p.321.

upon the subject of immortality: He advances the idea that the soul exists in its own right, neither coming into existence nor perishing. The soul is one and simple activity in living. He advances the idea that plants and animals have an immortal principle in them because they are sharers in Soul. Bodies have not true being, therefore resurrection is from the body rather than with the body. The author realizes the difficulty in trying to answer the question as to how far individuality is maintained Yonder. Yet Plotinus holds that souls are Logoi of Spirits and each represents a distinct entity in the spiritual world. This distinctness he regards as never lost, although the distinctions of Souls are latent in the world of Spirit. He quotes from the Enneads 4.8.4. and 3.2.4 to the effect that discarnate Souls are in a sense absorbed into the Universal Soul and help to govern the world. 1. From these statements it is clear that the author is correct in his conclusion that it is difficult to say how far individuality is maintained Yonder. It is true, however, that he insists that immortality will be on the impersonal plane. He quotes Keyserling to the effect that Mysticism ends in an impersonal immortality, and to the effect that the individual is not ultimate. 2. Yet the author on this same page asserts that 'The inner meaning and reality of each individual life, remains a distinct fact in the world of Spirit. On the basis of the abstract Unity which is seen in the monism of Neoplatonism, this problem of immortality is bound to be troublesome. It looks as though the extreme monism of Neoplatonism would mean the complete absorption

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.20-22
2. " " " Vol.II.p.23.

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of the soul so that immortality on the impersonal plane almost if not altogether amounts to annihilation. On the other hand, Personalism laying stress upon personality as real seems to awaken a much stronger presumption in favor of personal immortality. Personalism stands for the reality of the finite self, and thus holds to a limited pluralism as over and against the monism of absolute idealism. However, it insists on a basal unity personally conceived. Thus finding in personality the key to reality, and insisting that the problems of unity and identity, plurality and change may be understood only as we rise to the personal plane, personalism awakens stronger presuppositions in favor of immortality than is found in Neoplatonism which sees in personality a distinct limitation.

Plotinus' belief in transmigration of souls is discussed and the conclusion is reached that he is simply amusing himself in trying his hand at a Platonic myth. He recognizes that Plotinus is inconsistent holding at one time the belief in a purgatory for disembodied Souls, and again holding the belief that the bad are reborn as animals or that retribution, in kind, is their lot upon being reborn as men. Porphyry and Iamblichus, he shows, opposed the belief of Plotinus that human souls are ever sent to inhabit bodies of beasts and birds. 1. Among those who support the doctrine of transmigration in modern times, he cites the following: Krause, Swedenborg, Lavater, Ibsen, Maeterlinck, McTaggart, Hume, Goethe, and Lessing. He concludes that perhaps Plotinus and Hegel would agree that the question is meaningless. 2.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II. p.33,34.

2. " " " " II. p.34.

In summing up his exposition of the Personalistic position on the question of immortality, Dr. Knudson says, "No demonstration of the future life is possible. An extreme personalistic pluralism here deceives itself; and so also does that form of absolute idealism which seeks logically to deduce the future life from the being and character of God. Kant was right in basing the belief in immortality chiefly on the moral nature; but so was Plato in teaching that a theoretical as well as a practical basis for the belief is to be found in the nature of the soul and in the nature of God." 1. Plotinus, it will be seen does ground his belief upon the nature of the soul as real. He is not hindered in his conception by the question of the relation of the soul to the body, since he gave soul the place of preeminence. However, there remains the difficulty that the soul returning by contemplation to the One, has an ecstatic vision of the One and thereby loses all self-consciousness. This vision of the One must be removed which process looks very much like 'swooning' into the Absolute, nirvana, complete absorption into the One.

THE SPIRITUAL WORLD.

The author comments upon the fact that he met with difficulty in finding equivalents for the terms used by Plotinus. He concludes that the nearest we can come to the trinity in unity in which reality consists, is to use the terms - Spirit, Spiritual Perception, and the Spiritual World. Thus he argues that reality for Plotinus corresponds to reality as opposed to appearance in Bradley's philosophy, and that reality is neither thought nor thing but their indissoluble union. He holds that in thought and

1. Philos. of Personalism. p.327.Dr.Knudson.

thing there is a reciprocal relationship in which each implies the other. This reciprocal relationship, he points out, in his conception of Spirit and Spiritual World. These two, he holds, involve each other and cannot be separated. 1.

The following statements culled from the Enneads emphasize this position of Plotinus: "The Spiritual World cannot be outside Spirit. 'Spirit, the whole of reality, and truth are one nature.' Yet the relation is not bare identity. 'The perceiving Spirit must be one, and two, simple and not simple. ' 'Spirit by its power of perception, posits Being and Being by being perceived, gives to Spirit perception and existence.' 'The cause, both of spiritual perception and of Being is another' i.e. their common principle, the One. Thus the conclusion is reached that the two sides of reality are of equal rank, and not one derived from the other." Spirit in beholding reality, beheld itself, and in beholding entered into its proper activity, and this activity is itself.' 'Spirit knows that its own principle (the One) is above itself, and that that which comes next after the One is itself; and none else can bring it any surer knowledge than this about itself -- it knows that it exists in very truth, in the spiritual world. Absolute truth, therefore, agrees not with any other but with itself; it says nothing outside itself; it is, and what it is it says.' 'To know is the same as to be.' 'The Spirit that neither divides now is divided is not part of us; we pass into it only when we awake out of ourselves and find ourselves in the presence of the One which is beyond existence.' Thus the author argues that

Spirit when absolutely undivided and undividing is indistinguishable from the Absolute.' If Spirit-in-itself were the creator, the created would have to be inferior to Spirit, but close to Spirit and like Spirit; but since the creator (the Absolute) is beyond Spirit, the created must be Spirit. But why is the creator not Spirit? Because spiritual perception is the activity of Spirit.' From these quotations he concludes that Plotinus was no slave to technical terms, since he realized that sharp distinctions belong to the logical faculty, not to *noēs* and that these methods are inappropriate when considering the stage above the discursive intellect. Indeed it is on this basis of the fluid state of Spirit and Spiritual World, since they flow over into each other, that we have the Neoplatonic reconciliation of the One and the Many, of Sameness and Otherness. He comes to the conclusion that reality for Neoplatonism is eternal life; it is a never-failing spiritual activity; it is the continual self-expression of a God who 'speaks and it is done, who commands and it stands fast.' 1.

Personalist will have no quarrel with the aim of this exposition which is to account for the fact of knowledge and reality on the basis of an underlying unity which is spiritual. However, the position of Personalism seems much more secure in finding in personality itself the key to reality and in this the basis for the solution or reconciliation of the One and Many, Sameness and Otherness. The whole question as to the nature of reality as personal does not involve one in the weird abstractions of the Neoplatonists. This exposition of Plotinus' viewpoint reveals

1. Enneads 5 and 6. Philos. of Plotinus.
Vol.II.p-37-49

that Plotinus is very near the absolute idealism of Bradley.

One of the fundamental conceptions of reality for personalism is that reality is concrete and individual. For Neoplatonism reality is anything but concrete and individual. It is super-everything, transcending individuality. Neoplatonism and Personalism agree in asserting that fundamental reality is One, but the One of Neoplatonism is a unity that resolves itself into a bare abstraction. This is seen in its rejection of the personalistic position that ultimate reality is personal. Both hold that matter is phenomenal. Personalism holds the occasionalistic or panentheistic theory of matter. Matter is passive and furnishes only the occasions of mental or psychic activity. Neoplatonism is indeterminate in its conception of matter, holding that matter is outside being. The hierarchical conception of reality which is fundamental in Neoplatonism, reduces matter to a mere abstraction. Personalism is activistic, holding that activity constitutes the essential nature of being, while Neoplatonism holds to an abstract, transcendental unity that cannot be said to be dynamic.

In his exposition of Plotinus' viewpoint the author mentions three pairs of categories each consisting of opposites which are reconciled in the spiritual world: Spirit and Being, or Thought and Thing, Difference and Identity, Stability and Movement or Permanence and Change. 1. He recognizes that Plotinus is inconsistent in that sometimes he omits the first pair and makes four categories; sometimes he enumerates five, leaving out *vous*. He explains that Plotinus is following the obscure argument of Plato's Sophist without introducing clearness.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.58.

He finds Plotinus in error in treating the category of Being. Being is distinguished from Reality. He says, 'Being and Reality are different. Being is found by abstraction from the others (i.e. the other two pairs of categories); but Reality is Being together with Movement, Stability, Identity, and Difference.' He concludes that Being has the same relation to Spirit as Stability and Movement, and that Plotinus is in error in making *vous* and *noûs* a pair of categories by the side of the other two pairs. "For", he says, "the antithesis of Stability and Movement, and of Identity and Difference, belongs to the sphere of discursive reason, the Soul-World. They only become categories of Spirit when their contradictions are harmonised by being taken up into a higher sphere. But when they cease to be contradictories, they cease to be themselves." 1.

THE SAME AND OTHER.

The author develops Plotinus' view that the main task of Soul and of Spirit is to systematize and unify. The antithesis between Identity and Difference, he holds, is most fundamental, for only as we understand how it can be transcended can we hope to understand how Change and Permanence, Thought and Object, can be unified in the world of Spirit.' 2. It is Plotinus' doctrine that 'otherness and sameness emphasize each other'. Individual Spirits are not parts of the one Spirit. They exist in each other. 'The universal is implicit in the particular.' 'Spirit itself is not simple any more than Soul.' 'Spirit not only engenders all things; it is all things.' Thus the author reaches the conclu-

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.P.60.

2. " " " " II.p.61.

sion that plurality belongs to Spirit. 'Spirit is one in many, and many in One.' This relation he holds is not one of absolute identity. The antithesis of the Same and the Other is transcended in Spirit. 1.

MOVEMENT AND STABILITY.

The author emphasizes the fact that Greek philosophy before Plotinus, had recognized that Movement and Stability are complimentary ideas. He rightly classes Plato as no prophet of staticism by showing that in the Sophist he completely repudiates staticism. Plotinus follows his master here and holds that Spirit is perfect activity. He believes that Plotinus would agree with Bradley's conception of activity as self-caused change in time, but that he would differ from Bradley in holding that the idea of non-temporal activity was not meaningless. 2. Plotinus opposes Aristotle's conception of movement as imperfect activity, because there is 'movement in the world of Spirit.' 'Movement does not need time, which only measures the quantity of movement.' 3. He concludes that Plotinus holds that movement in the spiritual world is not antithetic to stability, since its activity is not a development of itself into something that it was not before. So far as the temporal process is concerned, movement is regarded as imperfect and the activity is regarded as imperfect in comparison with the movement in Spirit which does not need time.

He recognizes that the difficulty here is to prevent the two aspects of reality, Change and Permanence, from falling apart after

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.63.

2. " " " " II.p.65

3. Enneads 6.1.13. Philos.of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.65.

we have reconciled them. This, he shows, Plotinus does by his doctrine of ideas. "In the world of Soul the ideas are polarized, not only into a multiplicity of forms, but into a series of successive states within the unitary process." 1. His view is that the ideas are potentially present in the world of soul and by rising from the soul world, the One and Many, to the world of Spirit, the One-Many the problem is solved.

The author acknowledges that he is by no means satisfied with Plotinus' conception of the categories of the spiritual world. It is his contention that the discursive reason is inadequate when we come to comprehend the things of the Spirit. It is his conviction that we have to do with a kingdom of absolute values in the discussion of which we leave these dialectical problems behind. He would follow Proclus who recognizes that here we have to do with the kingdom of absolute values. These values, Goodness, Truth, and Beauty are attributes of Reality and constitute its essence. He says, "Things truly are, in proportion as they 'participate' in Goodness, Truth, and Beauty." 2. He recognizes the difficulty that inheres in this scheme in that judgments of value give us an essentially graduated world, and that judgments of existence are not so easily graduated. He refers to Bradley's contention that graduation belongs only to Appearance, but this would involve the separation of the world of phenomena from the world of Spirit. 3. He concludes that the solution offered by the spiritual philosophy of Plotinus is 'that

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.71.
2. " " " " II.p.74
3. " " " " II.p.79.

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and a list of the names of the persons who have been engaged in the work.

The second part of the report deals with the financial statement of the year. It shows the income and expenditure of the organization and the balance of the funds at the end of the year. It also shows the details of the various projects and the results achieved.

The third part of the report deals with the administrative work of the organization. It shows the progress of the various departments and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various projects and the results achieved.

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The eighth part of the report deals with the sports work of the organization. It shows the progress of the various sports projects and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various projects and the results achieved.

The ninth part of the report deals with the other work of the organization. It shows the progress of the various other projects and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various projects and the results achieved.

The tenth part of the report deals with the general conclusion of the year. It shows the progress of the various projects and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various projects and the results achieved.

Report of the Board of Directors
for the year 1911

the world is most adequately conceived under the form of spiritual values, rather than under the form of commensurable quantities. It is only when we think of ponderable quantities that the dilemma 'to be or not to be' leaves no escape.' 1. This solution is in common with the general plan of Neoplatonism that these difficulties will disappear as we reach a higher stage.

THE GREAT SPIRIT AND THE INDIVIDUAL SPIRITS.

In common with the hierarchical conception of reality, the relation of The Great Spirit to individual spirits, is one of a higher degree. The Great Spirit is the source of the particular Spirits. 'Each particular Spirit exists both in itself and in the Great Spirit, and the Great Spirit exists in each of them as well as in itself. The Great Spirit is the totality of Spirits in actuality, and each of them potentially.' 2.

The Great Spirit is a manifestation of a still higher reality which he holds is the ineffable Godhead. We know the Godhead only as Spirit which is the God of Neoplatonism. This sharing in the life of Spirit is 'except in rare moments of ecstasy' the highest degree of worship and spiritual joy to which a human being can attain. He shows that the Plotinian doctrine of Spirit is similar to the conception of communion with the Logos-Christ of the Fourth Gospel. 'Such similes as that of the vine and its branches, and such sayings as 'Abide in me, and I in you,' illustrate the relation of the Great Spirit to other Spirits in Neoplatonism.' 3. It is interesting to note here that

1. Philos. of Plotinus, Vol.II.p.80.

2. Enneads 6.2.20-22. Philos of Plotinus.Vol.II.p.82.

3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.83.

the author emphasizes the point that Soul in ascending to Spirit loses itself. What it loses, is its individuality, personality for he maintains that our highest life principle is supra-personal.

1. Yet he argues that there are 'differences', 'Qualitative differentiations' which keep spiritual things from completely fusing. He says, "These distinctions which do not involve separation, are a good thing, because they add to the richness of the real world which includes not only the diverse, but opposites." 2. He says that the individual Spirit is the same life as the individual Soul, 'only transformed into the Divine image and liberated from all baser elements. Individuality is maintained by 'something unique' in each Spirit; but it is no longer a bar to complete communion with all that is good, true, and beautiful in others. And this state, so far from being a mere ideal, is the only true reality, eternal and objectively true existence, the home of the Soul, which has its citizenship in heaven! 3.

It is in common with his conception of the relation of the Universal Soul to particular Souls that Plotinus considers the relation of the Great Spirit to particular Spirits. The Great Spirit, or Universal Spirit, is above particular Spirits and contains them all potentially. This is in common with his fluid conception of reality and in common with his idea that the higher relationships are supra-personal. By a process of mystical contemplation the Soul seems to escape to the higher realm of Spirit and rises to what he considers the home of the Soul. It is on this

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.84.
2. " " " " II.p.84.
3. " " " " II.p.85.

basis that Neoplatonism seeks to be rid of personality, for the Personalistic conception lays stress upon the personal as real while Neoplatonism seeks to escape to the realm of the impersonal, or supra-personal.

THE ABSOLUTE.

In his exposition of Plotinus' conception of the Absolute, the author acknowledges in the beginning that Bradley is his guide. He quotes Bradley to the effect that 'the relational form implies a substantial totality beyond relations'.....'Further, the ideas of goodness, and of the beautiful, suggest in different ways the same result...We gain from them the knowledge of a unity which transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance...And the mode of union in the abstract is actually given.' 1. This conception of the Absolute above all relations is in direct harmony with the system of Plotinus and serves to emphasize again the position of the writer that the hopes that Dean Inge has that Neoplatonism will again become the prevailing philosophy are very slender indeed.

The author explains that Plotinus follows Plato closely in his treatment of dialectic. 'It is a science which enables us to reason about each thing, to say what it is and how it differs from others, what it has in common with them, where it is, whether it really exists, to determine how many real beings there are, and where not being is to be found instead of true being...It speaks of all things scientifically and not according to simple opinion... It traverses the whole domain of the spiritual, and then by analysis returns to its starting point'. 2. The author emphasizes the fact

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 105 Note
Bradley's Appearance and Reality. p. 160.
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 106.

that for Plotinus, Dialectic is the study of first principles which leads up to intuitive wisdom, that it passes through logic and rises above it. Plotinus' dialectic 'rests when it has traversed the whole domain of Spirit.' 1. He says that Plotinus like Eckhart distinguishes between God and the Godhead. Thus in his conception of the Godhead his position is that we know the Godhead only as he reveals Himself as Spirit. "The God whom we commonly worship is the revelation, not the revealer. The source and ground of revelation cannot be revealed; the ground of knowledge cannot be known. So the common source and ground of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty must be beyond existence and beyond knowledge."2

THE ABSOLUTE AS THE ONE.

By the One Plotinus does not mean the One in the numerical sense. His conception is that of the whole that gives birth to the parts. 'The One is the source from which the differentiation of unity and plurality proceeds; it is the transcendence of separability rather than the negation of plurality.' 3. He sees that Plotinus seeks to escape the dualism of Spirit and Spiritual World which he regards as inseparable, and each of which he regards as a unity in duality. Thus he seeks the deeper unity lying back of them which he regards as the One.

THE ONE AS BEYOND EXISTENCE.

According to the author, there are three principles that must be remembered in considering the Absolute as beyond existence. (1) 'The nature of the Godhead is certainly unknown to us; we are unable to form any idea of the absolute and unconditioned. (2) It is

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.107.
2. " " " " II.p.107.
3. " " " " II.p.108.

a principle of this philosophy that we are not cut off from the highest form of life--the eternal and universal life of Spirit. (3) We have in the mystical state, an experience of intuition which is formless and indescribable, and which is therefore above the spiritual world of Forms or Ideas." 1. He traces this doctrine from Eucleides of Megara who first identified the Good and the One, who is also called God and Wisdom, through Plato to Plotinus. Plato and Philo he regards as conceiving the Good as 'beyond Reality', 2, but not beyond being. Clement of Alexandria he shows held the meaningless position that the God is beyond the One and above the Monad. Origen held that divine inspiration was necessary for knowledge of God. He quotes Augustine to the effect that we can know what God is not but not what he is. Eregina follows Plotinus in holding that the Absolute is beyond being and that in the Absolute the three persona of the Trinity are fused. He points out that Eckhart desires to refrain from denying being to the Godhead yet he speaks of the Godhead as 'darkness'; the silence'. 3.

The following selections from the Enneads which the author quotes throw very little light upon the subject except to reveal that Plotinus held that the Absolute is beyond Being, beyond all attributes; "The One is beyond *ἐνέργεια*, beyond activity, beyond *νόος* and *νοήσις*. It is 'an activity beyond *νόος* and sense and life.' 'We may call it First Activity, or First Potency.' It

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.109.
2. " " " " II.p.110.
3. " " " " II p.109-112.

has no limit or boundary but is fundamentally infinite.' It is 'ineffable'. 'Will must not be ascribed to the Absolute, if Will implies the desire for something not yet present.' 'The One is super-conscious, possessing immediate apprehension.' 'The Absolute is all necessity as being subject to no necessity.' 'Being absolutely free, the One is the giver of freedom.' 'The One does not think but has self discernment, a kind of self-consciousness.' 'That which is absolutely self-sufficing does not even need itself.' 'The One abides in a state of wakefulness 'beyond Being'. 1.

The author acknowledges the criticism as just that Plotinus, after protesting that nothing can be said of the Absolute, tells us a good deal about the Absolute even investing him with the attribute of a personal God. This same criticism, he applies to Spencer's Unknowable and to Hartmann's Unconscious. However, he considers that the real question is whether the dialectic leads to an Absolute 'beyond existence', and he shows that it does. He concludes that Plotinus might have accepted the practical suggestion that the God of practical religion is the Universal Soul, the God of devout and thankful contemplation, the Great Spirit, the God of our most inspired moments the Absolute. 2.

THE ONE AS INFINITE.

In this exposition, the author develops the idea that Neoplatonism regards the One as fundamentally infinite and at the same time Matter is spoken of as infinite. Thus he notes the danger of the meeting of extremes such as exists in Spencer's Philosophy. He seeks to overcome this difficulty by saying that if they are different

1. Enneads quoted Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 113-114
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 116.

it is because in the philosophy of Plotinus 'the One' has already begun to differentiate himself, and Matter to receive forms. He concludes that this is a region where discursive thought is no longer adequate. He notes that Plotinus holds that to mount above $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is to fall outside it and that Proclus holds that the extremes at top and bottom are simple but that the intermediate are complex. 1. It seems that here is a weakness in Neoplatonism that I do not think the author overcomes. Throughout the exposition $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ has been regarded as the center of the system, as real. Due to the overflow of the One, all of the lower orders of being come into existence until we reach Matter which is regarded as 'not being'. In the upward climb of the soul each lower order is regarded as matter for the higher until we reach the One which is clearly regarded as 'beyond being'. Thus we have two extremes both of which are abstractions. While Dean Inge denies that they are the same, Matter and the One are viewed much in the same light. As has been pointed out before, Plotinus does help us forward to the phenomenality of matter yet in his system the relation of the two extremes is not clear.

In his exposition of the idea of the infinite the author distinguishes between the fact of limit which he holds implies the indefinite and the act of limiting which implies the infinite. 2. He concludes that we know not the infinite, but the fact of the infinite which is implied in the act of knowing. He distinguishes between the Platonic conception of infinity which he holds is that infinity suggests the absence of Form, which in all objects of

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.116-117

2. " " " " II.p.117.

thought is an evil, and the common conception that infinity asserts freedom from all limitations. Rothe, who denies that infinity can be applied to God is quoted to the effect that Absoluteness and infinitude are in no way identical conceptions, his objection being that God is to be considered as outside of space while infinitude is an idea which belongs to space. The author concludes there is no harm in adopting Augustine's expression that God has his center everywhere and his circumference nowhere. 1.

THE ONE AS FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL CAUSE.

He indicates that Plotinus clearly asserts the causality of the Absolute. However, he explains that causality means little more than the assertion of a hierarchy in Reality leading up to an all embracing Absolute. He recognizes that Plotinus was aware of the difficulty in showing how plurality can emanate from unity, and Being from the super-essential. This problem is met by Plotinus in his theory of creation. Here again we meet with a difficulty that the author's exposition does not succeed in removing. Creation for Plotinus is simply the overflow of the One. The whole conception of emanation from the One which Dean Inge shows is due to necessity, is a species of pantheism. 2. The figure which Plotinus uses is that of 'the efflux of light and heat from the sun which loses nothing in imparting itself.' 3. In his footnote he classes the illustration as unfortunate in that it is used by critics to discredit the theistic doctrine of

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.117-118.
2. " " " " II.p.120.
3. " " " " II.p.120.

creation. 1. He holds that Plotinus' theory in some ways resembles the Hegelian conception which makes the world necessary to the Absolute, yet he repudiates this interpretation on the basis that Plotinus does insist upon the complete independence of the One. 2. The difficulty here is that Plotinus arrives at the independence of the One only by a process of abstraction. He denies that the infinite regress led Plotinus to take refuge in a citadel beyond thought, on the basis that for Plotinus things in time are not causes. He asserts, and rightly, that the Absolute by the creation of a world wholly dependent upon itself does not cease to be Absolute, but the difficulty is that by creation Plotinus is upholding the theory of emanation on the basis of necessity. 3. In this connection I think that Harnack's exposition is much nearer the truth than the conception advanced by Dean Inge. "The primeval Being is, as opposed to the many, the One; as opposed to the finite, the Infinite, the unlimited. It is the source of all life, and therefore absolute causality and the only real existence. It is, moreover the Good, in so far as all finite things have their purpose in it, and ought to flow back to it. But one cannot attach moral attributes to the original Being itself, because these would imply limitation. It has no attributes of any kind; it is without magnitude, without life, without thought; in strict propriety, indeed, we ought not to speak of it as existing; it is "above existence", "above goodness". It is also active force without a substratum; as active force the primeval Being is perpetually producing something else, without alteration, or motion,

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.120.note
2. " " " " II.p.121.
3. " " " " II.p.120-121

or diminution of itself. This production is not a physical process, but an emission of force; and, since the product has real existence only in virtue of the original existence working in it, Neoplatonism may be described as a species of dynamic pantheism." 1.

THE VISION OF THE ONE.

The ecstatic vision of the One is a conception upon which the author lays a great deal of emphasis. Yet he seeks to develop the conclusion that ecstasy is not an important part of the system of Plotinus. In his denial that ecstasy is an important part of this system, he makes the statement that 'ecstasy has been thrust into the foreground and exaggerated as Western critics of Buddhism have exaggerated the importance of Nirvana.' He reaches the conclusion that in both cases the doctrines have been exaggerated. 2. It is interesting to note, however, that he devotes some thirty-two pages to his exposition of this topic, and that the impression throughout is such as to lead one to the directly opposite conclusion.

He lays down as the ultimate doctrine of Neoplatonic metaphysics that we can know the unknowable, 'because in our deepest ground we are the unknowable.' 3. It is his conception that only by aspiring love can the Spirit become that which it can never know, the absolute Ground of all being. In this ecstatic experience thinker and thought are so identified that both knowledge and consciousness are lost. 4. The terms used to express the aim of this

1. Harnack. Article Neoplatonism. Ency. Brit. 14 Ed.
Vol. 16. p. 218.

2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 159.

3. " " " " II. p. 132.

4. " " " " II. p. 132.

experience are "vision" or "immediate apprehension" yet he avows that these and any other words are inadequate to express what they aim at. 1. This exposition reminds one of the slang expression, current a few years ago which was to the effect that one may have a feeling of an inward inexpressibility of an outward all-over-ishness.

The following selections, from the copious quotations from the Enneads which the author gives, serve to give us some little understanding of what this ecstatic experience meant for Plotinus: "But we must go higher, for many other reasons and especially because the principle which we seek is the Absolute which is independent of all things...That which makes being and independence is not in itself being and independence, but above both...For although it permeates all Truth, and therefore the Truth of which we participate, nevertheless it escapes us when we try to speak of it or even to think of it. For the discursive reason, if it wishes to say anything, must seize first one element of the Truth and then another; such are the conditions of discursive thought. But how can discursive thought apprehend the absolutely simple? It is enough to apprehend it by a kind of spiritual apprehension. But in this act of apprehension we have neither the power nor the time to say anything about it; afterwards we can reason about it. We may believe that we have really seen, when a sudden light illumines the soul; for this light comes from the One and is the One....For that which we seek to behold is the light which gives us light, even as we can only see the sun the light of the sun. How then can this come to us? Strip thyself of everything. 2.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.132.

2. Enneads.5.3.1. quoted Philos.of Plotinus.Vol.II.p.134.

"The Soul must remove from itself good and evil and everything else, that it may receive the One alone, as the One is alone. When the Soul is so blessed, and is come to it, or rather when it manifests its presence, when the Soul turns away from visible things and makes itself beautiful as possible and becomes like the One; (the manner of preparation and adornment is known to those who practise it) and seeing the One suddenly appearing in itself, for there is nothing between, nor they any longer two, but one; for you cannot distinguish between them while the vision lasts; it is that union of which the union of earthly lovers, who wish to blend their being with each other, is a copy." 1.

"It does not call the object of its vision Spirit, although it has itself been transformed into Spirit before the vision and lifted up into the abode of Spirits. When the Soul arrives at the intuition of the One, it leaves the mode of spiritual perception... For when the Spirit is inebriated with the nectar, it falls in love, in simple contentment and satisfaction; and it is better for it to be so intoxicated than to be too proud for such intoxication." 2.

"If so the Soul must forsake all that is external and turn itself wholly to that which is within; it will not allow itself to be distracted by anything external, but will ignore them all, as at first by not attending to them, so now last by not seeing them; it will not even know itself; and so it will come to the vision of the One and will be united with it; and then, after a

1. Enneads 6.7.34. quoted Philos.of Plotinus.
Vol.II.p.136.
2. Enneads 6.7.35. quoted Philos.of Plotinus.
Vol.II.p.136.

sufficient converse with it, it will return and bring word, if it be possible, to others of its heavenly intercourse." 1.

He likens Souls to a choir of singers who stand around a conductor who, 'when they look at the conductor sing well and are really with him. So we move round the One; if we did not we should be dissolved and no longer exist; but we do not always look towards the One. When we do, we attain the end of our existence, and our repose, and we no longer sing out of tune, but form in very truth a divine chorus round the One...In this choral dance the Soul sees the fountain of Spirit, the source of Being, the cause of Good, the root of Soul. These do not flow out of the One in such a way as to diminish it; for we are not dealing with material quantities, else the products of the One would be perishable, whereas they are eternal, because their source remains not divided among them but constant. Therefore, the products too are permanent, as the light remains while the sun remains." 2.

Of the mystical experience he says, "Then we can see Him and ourselves, as far as is permitted: we see ourselves glorified, full of spiritual light, or rather we see ourselves as pure, subtle, ethereal, light; we become divine, or rather we know ourselves to be divine. Then indeed is the flame of life kindled, that flame which, when we sink back to earth, sinks with us." 3.

Of this vision and the relation of the Soul to the One he says: "But in the vision that which sees is not reason but something greater than and prior to reason, something presup-

1. Enneads 6.9.7. quoted Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 137.
2. " 2.9.7. " " " " " II. p. 139.
3. " 2.9.7. " " " " " II. p. 141.

posed by reason, as is the object of vision. He who then sees himself, when he sees will see himself as a simple being, will be united to himself, as such, will feel himself become such. We ought not even to say that he will see, but he will be that which he sees, if indeed it is possible any longer to distinguish seer and seen, and not boldly to affirm that the two are one. In this state the seer does not see or distinguish or imagine two things; he becomes another, he ceases to be himself and to belong to himself. He belongs to Him and is one with Him, like two concentric circles; they are one when they coincide, and two only when they are separated. It is only in this sense that the Soul is other. Therefore this vision is hard to describe, for how can one describe, as other than oneself, that which, when one saw it, seemed to be one with oneself." 1.

Of this relation of the Soul to the One he says: "It ceases to be Being; it is above Being, while in communion with the One. If then a man sees himself become one with the One, he has in himself a likeness of the One, and if he passes out of himself, as an image to its archetype, he has reached the end of his journey. And when he comes down from his vision, he can again awaken the virtue that is in him, and seeing himself fitly adorned in every part he can again mount upward through virtue to Spirit, and through wisdom to the One itself. Such is the life of gods and godlike and blessed men; a liberation from all earthly bonds, a life that takes no pleasure in earthly things, a flight of the alone to the Alone." 2.

1. Enneads 2.9.7. quoted Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.141.

2. " 6.9.7. " " " " " " II.p.143.

In commenting upon these and many similar quotations from the *Enneads* the author seeks to bring out the point that Plotinus was cautious about asserting the complete union of the Soul with the One in the mystical experience. He quotes Arnou upon this point to the effect that Plotinus was fond of inserting qualifying phrases with regard to this matter of complete union. 1. In spite of the footnotes to the contrary, one is inclined to the belief that Dean Inge does not make a clear case for Plotinus in this matter of absorption into the One. In such statements as the following taken from the preceding quotations it looks as though Schwegler's word concerning 'swooning into the Absolute and mystical absorption into the One, is very near the truth. 2. 'It will not even know itself; and so it will come to the vision of the One and will be united with it.' 'And seeing the One suddenly appearing in itself, for there is nothing between, nor are they any longer two, but one.' 'If a man sees himself become one with the One, he has in himself a likeness of the One, and if he passes out of himself, as an image to its archetype, he has reached the end of his journey.' In his remarks concerning this mystical experience the author goes so far as to say, "The Spirit becomes for a moment that which it can never know, the absolute Ground of all being." 3. It seems that there is good ground for the interpretation that the experience Plotinus is describing means nothing

1. Arnou. Footnote Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 141.
2. Schwegler, Hist. of Philos. p. 140.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 132.

less than mystical absorption into the One.

In his statement, already quoted to the effect that ecstasy is no important part of Plotinus' system, one is inclined to believe that the author is inconsistent. He takes the position that Plotinus does claim to give us a real metaphysics of mysticism. In his comment here he commends Plotinus in that he has put the vision of the One in its right place at the apex of the pyramid which ascends, as the dialectic guides us, from the many and discordant to the One. 1. Again this same position is emphasized in his statement that 'we can know the unknowable and that this is the ultimate ground of Neoplatonic metaphysics. 2. Indeed his whole exposition leads one to the conclusion that the dialectic carries us up to the Spirit and through Spirit and by the help of the mystical experience arrives at the One. He says that Plotinus refuses to separate the intellectual from the moral and the mystical, and that they begin to join long before our journey's end. 3. Indeed one is forced to the conclusion that the mystical trance is one of the distinctive parts of Plotinus' system.

In fairness to the author's exposition, we must note that he bases his conclusion that ecstasy is unimportant in Plotinus' system upon the fact that for Plotinus and his followers it was a rare experience. 4. We must agree that this statement is true but it is also true that the reason that the experience was rare was because of the method he followed. For him the mystical state occurs only

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.145.
2. " " " " II.p.132.
3. " " " " II.p.107.
4. " " " " II.p.153.

as a sequel to a prolonged period of intense mental concentration, turning of the thoughts within. This was possible, of course only to a few and readily accounts for the fact that it was rare. However, we must conclude that rareness does not lessen the fact of its importance.

It is interesting in this connection that he absolves Plotinus from any trace of self-hypnotisation such as is found among Oriental mystics who hypnotise themselves by gazing at some bright object. He does make the concession however, that the intense abstraction and concentration of thought may doubtless have the same result as protracted gazing upon some chosen object. 1. Here again it seems the difference is in method only. It seems that one might be justified in accounting for the theurgy of later Neoplatonists on the basis that they were seeking the same results but by easier methods. Although the author would regard later Neoplatonism as a corruption of Plotinus' teaching, after all we must conclude that with Plotinus they regarded the mystical experience as an important part of the system.

In considering this exposition of Plotinus' teaching regarding the Absolute one is forced to conclude that here again is proof that his hope that Neoplatonism may become the prevailing philosophy rests upon a very flimsy basis. His Absolute is an abstraction and nothing else. In many ways Bradley's Absolute is similar to that of Plotinus. Bradley proceeds to reduce everything to appearance and finally resolves everything into an Absolute out of all relation. 2. He reaches this conclusion by a process of abstraction.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.154.

2. Bradley. Appearance & Reality. p.486.

Plotinus reaches the same conclusion but he uses the mystical swoon to reach the One, an Absolute equally above relations, qualities, in fact supra-everything. When one remembers that the positivism of Comte and the later reactions of James' Pragmatism came into prominence as a direct protest against such systems one sees little ground indeed for the author's hope that we may return to Plotinus.

Throughout his exposition, it is clear that the One for Plotinus is impersonal. 1. Reality conceived of as personal is the 'bête noire' of all such systems. Indeed it is just here that the philosophy of Personalism is making its strongest contribution in insisting that personality is the key to reality and that any other approach to the problems of change and identity of time and eternity must involve one in meaningless abstractions of the absolute idealists or the agnosticism of Comte and his successors.

Dean Albert C. Knudson holds that the three main positions with regard to the Absolute are as follows: the agnostic, regards the Absolute as unknowable; the Logical view, regards the Absolute as the All, the position since Hegel; the Causal view, regards the Absolute as the ultimate Ground of the World 2. This latter view may be said to represent the Personalistic position. In this view God and the Absolute are regarded as identical, that is, God or Absolute is not conceived as the Logical All but as the ultimate Ground of the world. In this connection, Professor Brightman in contrasting the position of what he calls absolutism with that of Personalism, points out that for absolutism, (absolute

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.161.
2. Conference notes.

idealism) God is all that there is; for personalism, God is not all there is, --- human persons are no part of Him. It is his position that in finite selves God wills the existence of what is genuinely other than himself; so ~~that~~ the universe is ultimately a society of selves, not a single self. He points out that both systems hold that the unity and the plurality of the universe alike depend upon the Absolute Self; but absolutism swallows up the plurality in the unity, while personalism holds that the facts demand a real plurality dependent for its being on the unity, yet not wholly determined in detail by the unity. 1.

The position of Professor Marlatt is that of typical personalism. In his exposition of the idea of "person" he says that it provides an idea of person under which God may conceivably be personal without impairing the Absoluteness, Oneness, Omni-presence, and Omnipotence which have been, and should be, attributed to Him. 2

In this connection it is interesting to note that Dean Inge is unequivocal in his utter condemnation of pluralists who advocate the idea of a limited struggling God, who does his best to overcome insuperable obstacles. He says, "This dualism corresponds to the attitude of the pure moralist, who is occupied in combating evil without trying to account for it; but it is intolerable both for philosophy and for religion." 3. His position here is in direct opposition to James and Wells who uphold the idea of a finite God, but Dean Inge is equally opposed to the personalistic view. In this strife between the extreme pluralists and the absolutists, Personalism takes the mediating view holding to a limited pluralism and to a basal monism conceived in terms of personality.

1. Brightman. An introduction to Philos. p.246.
2. Marlatt. What is a Person? Boston University Bulletin.
Vol. XIV. May 25, 1925. No. 15.
3. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 235.

It seems to me that the personalistic conception of the Absolute world Ground as personal comes much nearer to gripping the real problem than does the idea of a super-personal Absolute which is nothing less than a mere abstraction. It is the position of personalists that the World Ground conceived as impersonal, necessarily involves one in abstractions that mystify rather than clarify. This fact alone is enough to convince one that the author's hopes that we may return to the philosophy of Plotinus, rest upon a very insecure basis.

ETHICS & RELIGION.

The author develops the point that the connection of ethics with metaphysics became closer and closer throughout the history of Greek thought and that in the last stage the fusion is almost complete. He quotes Eucken to the effect that it is the special glory of Christianity that its ethics are metaphysical and its metaphysics ethical. This he holds is likewise true of Neoplatonism. 1.

In his exposition of the ethics of Neoplatonism he brings out the specific points as follows: Plotinus considers the practice of political virtues as preceding the first stage of purification. Purification for him means to detach the Soul from the body and to elevate it to the spiritual world. This is achieved by keeping the body under by the practice of asceticism, a certain flight from the world in order to liberate the soul. This asceticism was not of an extreme form. "He would have us live so simply that our bodily wants are no interruption to our mental and spiritual

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.164.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The history of the United States is a story of a people who have grown from a small colony of English settlers to a great nation. The story begins in 1492 when Christopher Columbus discovered the New World. The first English settlers came to the United States in 1607. They were the first of many waves of immigrants who came to the United States in search of a better life. The United States has a long and rich history. It has been a land of freedom and opportunity for all who have lived here. The United States has made many contributions to the world. It has been a leader in the development of science and technology. It has been a champion of human rights. The United States has a bright future ahead of it.

THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION

The United States was founded by a group of men who were known as the Founding Fathers. They were men of great vision and courage. They fought for the rights of the people and for the principles of democracy. The Founding Fathers created the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution is the foundation of the United States government. It sets out the powers of the government and the rights of the people. The Founding Fathers also created the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights is a list of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. It guarantees the rights of the people, such as the right to free speech and the right to a fair trial. The Founding Fathers are remembered for their great contributions to the United States.

The United States has a long and rich history. It has been a land of freedom and opportunity for all who have lived here. The United States has made many contributions to the world. It has been a leader in the development of science and technology. It has been a champion of human rights. The United States has a bright future ahead of it. The United States is a great nation. It is a land of hope and opportunity. The United States is a land where everyone can live and thrive. The United States is a land where the American Dream is possible. The United States is a land where the future is bright.

interests." 1. He acknowledges the weakness of Plotinus in his lack of appreciation of the body. Plotinus seemed to be ashamed of his body, refusing to have his portrait painted. A proper regard for the body equally with a proper regard for the spirit is wanting in his thought. 2. He develops the idea that Plotinus held that the process of emancipation was a struggle against darkness rather than against a hostile spiritual power. He held the interesting view that 'vice is still human, being mixed with something contrary to itself.' This he points out rests upon his mystical doctrine that there remains a spark of the Divine in man which never consents to evil. 3.

The next stage above purification is that of enlightenment. This is the stage occupied by philosophers which stage, the author considers, was regarded by Plotinus and his predecessors as morally the highest. 4. This stage of contemplation he regards as above that of active philanthropy. He makes clear the point that for Plotinus contemplation was no idle self enjoyment, but the interplay of Spirit and the spiritual world. 5. He notes the error in the Plotinian ethics in that he supposed that humble occupations are a bar to the highest life. He further notes that this error which Greek thought never outgrew had not a little to do with the decay of Greek culture. 6.

The highest stage that of unification, the author regards as hardly belonging to ethics. He quotes Plotinus to the effect that

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol. II. p. 167.
2. " " " " II. p. 171.
3. " " " " II. p. 172.
4. " " " " II. p. 177.
5. " " " " II. p. 181.
6. " " " " II. p. 190.

there is progress in heaven, and that Love is an activity of the Soul desiring the Good. This higher Love he regards not as a relation between externals but between Spirit and Spirit. He says that it is unity in duality, the reconciliation of these opposites, known in experience. 1. This position with regard to the mystical relation with the One has been considered previously and found unsatisfactory. He arrives at this conception of unity in duality only by positing the One above all relations. This of course is the conclusion reached by Absolute idealists and has been considered as inadequate on the basis that such a unity is a bare abstraction and does not give any insight into the problem.

He notes another defect in the Neoplatonic ethics and that is the moral isolation of the Neoplatonic Saint. He says that in Plotinus we find no ideas of corporate penitence and atoning sympathy.. This he regards as a defect that is a fatal bar to understanding and solving any social or moral problem. 2. In his previous discussion he notes that Plotinus here was following the Greek ideal in his desire to be invulnerable, and therefore he undervalued the need of human sympathy. He sees here the contrast between the Christian ideal of emancipation by sympathy and the Stoical ideal of emancipation by perfect inner detachment. Of course the superiority of the Christian ideal cannot be overestimated. 3.

Here again we have evidence of the failure of Neoplatonism which the author readily acknowledges. He is careful to emphasize the close relationship between ethics and metaphysics and yet he

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II. p.188.
2. " " " " II. p.191.
3. " " " " II.p.174-175.

does not seem to sense the point that the errors in Neoplatonic ethics are the direct result of an inferior conception of reality. Certainly the ethics of Personalism are much more in line with the higher Christian conception and just so because of a truer understanding of the nature of reality.

In his religious conceptions the author explains that in Plotinus there is much crude spiritism. He makes room for the gods of popular worship and likewise, holds that the sun and stars are divine beings and that the world is the 'third god'. This he regards as due to an inherited tradition which he could not cast off. 1. He shows that Plotinus held that the higher soul alone was exempt from magic and sorcery but that the irrational soul was not. This opened the way to an encouragement of witchcraft and helped to elevate superstition into a dogma. 2.

The author explains that Plotinus' conception of prayer was that of approaching the higher spiritual powers by contemplation and meditation without making requests. However, he believes that the lower spirits are amenable to petitions, this kind of prayer being a branch of sympathetic magic. However, the point is emphasized that true prayer for Plotinus consists in the unspoken yearnings of the Soul for a closer walk with God, and that the object of prayer is to become one with the Being who is addressed. 3. In this connection he explains the sphere of the Divine to include the One, Spirit, and Universal Soul. In addressing prayers, there

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.195-197
2. " " " " II.p.200-201.
3. " " " " II.p.201-202.

are distinctions between the three Divine Hypostases. Thus he concludes that if our minds turn towards anything in space or time for which we hope, we address the Universal Soul. When praying for Spiritual progress, knowledge of God, heaven, we address the Great Spirit. Then again by means of the mystical trance, rapt into ecstasy we shall hope that we are in communion with the One--the Godhead. The author makes the personal observation that we envisage God under these three aspects in prayers, and offers the interesting suggestion that we might classify theologians under the three heads, namely, those who worship the Soul of humanity, or the Soul of the world; those who worship the Lord of the eternal and spiritual realm; and those who approach the ineffable Godhead. He considers it a strong point that Plotinus has room for all three, and that he shows how we may pass from one mode of worship to the other. 1.

He discusses the criticism of Neoplatonism in comparison with Christianity that is offered by Eucken. The main points of this criticism are as follows: That which unites Plotinus with Hellenism must separate him from Christianity. He emphasizes this point that Plotinus follows the Hellenic tradition in asserting the co-ordination of humanity with the All, the soul life and even the deification of natural forces, the expectation of happiness from active conduct, the high estimation of thought and knowledge as the Divine spark in man. He notes that in both are found uncompromising inwardness and drawing to God by renunciation of the world. He notes that Plotinus finds this inwardness in an impersonal spirituality, while Christianity finds it in a development

of the personal life. Again he shows that in Neoplatonism salvation comes from the power of thought, in Christianity it comes from sincerity of heart. He says, "In Plotinus we find an abandonment of the first world, a fading of time in the light of eternity, a repose in view of the Whole. In Christianity we find an entrance of the eternal into time, a world-historical movement, a power working against the irrationality of the actual. In the former we have a disappearance of man before the endlessness of the All; in the latter, a transposition of man and humanity into the central point of the All. In the former, an isolation of the thinker on the heights of contemplation of the world; in the latter a close welding together of individuals in full community of life and sorrow." 1. In this connection Eucken finds a contradiction in Neoplatonism between the doctrine of inwardness and the impersonality of the world of which man is a part.

He considers the criticism of Baron von Hügel who finds inconsistency between Plotinus the metaphysician and Plotinus the saint and who claims that in Plotinus' philosophy God is exiled from the world and the world from him. 2.

In answering these criticisms the author has very little to say with regard to Eucken's statement except that he charges Eucken with overemphasizing the intellectualism of Plotinus. 3. Indeed it is my opinion that Eucken's criticism cannot be answered. He points out differences that are fundamental, such as the impersonal spirituality of Plotinus, the deification of natural forces,

1. Eucken. Lebensanschauungen Grosser Denker
quoted Philos. of Plotinus Vol. II. p. 205-206.
2. Philos. of Plotinus Vol. II. p. 206.
3. " " " " II. p. 206.

the disappearance of man before the All, the isolation of the Neoplatonic saint. These differences cannot be reconciled and point to the conclusion that has been stated before, that Neoplatonism cannot win the attention of the world. The author holds that Baron von Hügel follows French critics who regard the method of abstraction of 'peeling the onion' as the characteristic instrument of Plotinian dialectic. He says that the spiritual world is the home of the Soul for Plotinus and that this is the conclusion of his dialectic. 1. He is insistent that in Plotinus' philosophy and religion there is no contradiction. It seems to me that the charge of abstraction is one that Neoplatonism cannot escape. In both philosophy and religion the element of abstraction is so inherent that this alone would preclude the possibility of Neoplatonism becoming the prevailing philosophy.

The author considers the Criticism of Augustine and regards his statement as just. He found everything in Neoplatonism except the doctrine of the Incarnation. "But that 'he came unto his own, and his own received him not; but as many as received him, to them gave he power to become sons of God, even to them that believe on his name'---this I could not find there... But that 'the Logos was made flesh and dwelt among us'--this I found not there. I could discover in these books, though expressed in other and varying phrases, that 'the Son was in the form of the Father, and thought it not robbery to be equal with God', because by nature he was the same substance. But that 'he emptied himself, taking upon him the form of a servant....and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,'...these books do not contain."2.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.207.

2. Augustine. quoted Philos.of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.208.

This criticism he regards as legitimate so that we may conclude that religion for Dean Inge means Neoplatonism with the doctrine of the Incarnation added. There is one point, however, which he regards as a real weakness and that is that the Greeks emphasized the independence and invulnerability of man. He considers that this precludes the possibility of self surrender, and also emphasis upon the fact that man needs his fellows. 1. This weakness in Plotinian ethics was considered before and the conclusion reached was that it rests upon the fundamental defect in Neoplatonism, in that it insists that reality must be conceived in impersonal terms. There is very little prospect indeed, that Neoplatonism has vitality enough to enable it to appeal to this age. Our interest in it must remain largely historical.

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

In making a concluding summary of Dean Inge's exposition of the Philosophy of Plotinus the following points stand out in favor of his view as to the importance of Neoplatonism. His conclusion as to the importance of Neoplatonism to the student who would understand traditional Christianity is undoubtedly correct. Neoplatonism did exert a tremendous influence through the pseudo-Dionysius Clement, Origen, Augustine and Scotus Erigena. These great names suggest that that influence has been far reaching; in fact, the modern churches that strongly emphasize the traditional element, are still strongly under that influence. It remains to be pointed out however, that the main interest of the student must be historical rather than that we find it possessing a conquering vitality such as Dean Inge seems to discover.

1. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol.II.p.209.

Another point is in direct harmony with the above conclusion and that is that the contributions of Neoplatonism in the field of philosophy are important but that they also are to be appreciated from the standpoint of historical development. Neoplatonism does help us forward to a clearer understanding of the phenomenality of matter but as has been explained his conception is by no means clear of difficulties.

Still another emphasis of Neoplatonism is important and that is the advance made by Plotinus in stressing the immateriality of the Soul. His ability to distinguish clearly between the body and the Soul was a real contribution to a better understanding of the problem and laid a foundation that makes for a firmer ground for our belief in immortality. Here again, however, we must note that his lack of appreciation of personality is a defect. His emphasis upon the impersonal and super-personal makes it impossible that his conceptions should prevail to any very great degree today.

Another point that needs to be emphasized is that Plotinus is important for those who would understand Mysticism in its historical development. It seems that here is the author's chief interest in Plotinus. His emphasis upon the mystical will always appeal to certain minds. It is very doubtful however, if the world will adopt his metaphysics of mysticism. Beyond a certain practical emphasis mysticism will always prove distasteful to multitudes. Indeed, the preponderance of abstractions in Neoplatonic philosophy makes his emphasis upon the mystical seem only natural. I think that we must agree with Professor Jones when he says that "negative" philosophy is no proper or inherent part of mysticism. He says, "It belongs to a long and tragic stage of

human thinking. I do not want to do anything to perpetuate it. I want to transcend its abstract reality by substituting for it a reality that is self communicative and concrete...He is a being, not of abstractness and negations, but of character and purpose."1.

We can readily agree with Harnack in his estimate of Neoplatonism that never before in the Greek and Roman theory of the world did the conviction of the dignity of man and his elevation above nature attain so certain an expression as in Neoplatonism . We can accept his conclusion that the ethical emphasis which Neoplatonism sought to beget and confirm, was the highest and purest which the culture of the ancient world produced. We must also agree with him that as a philosophy and as a religion, Neoplatonism utterly failed. 2.

In considering the weaknesses of Neoplatonism, the following points need to be emphasized; In the first place, as has been maintained throughout this paper, Neoplatonism is in error in its conception of the fundamental nature of reality. No impersonal conception of reality that necessarily lands one in abstractions, can ever hope to become the prevailing conception. On this basis as has been explained, Neoplatonism can never solve the problem of unity and plurality, time and eternity. The only escape is that of positing abstractions. On the other hand, the Personalistic approach, that personality furnishes the key to reality, goes far toward understanding these problems and at the same time avoids the pitfall of such conceptions as the One, the Absolute beyond all relations.

1. Jones. Some Exponents of Mystical Religion.p.115.
2. Harnack. History of Dogma. Vol.I.p.336 f.

Another weakness in the Neoplatonic system is his doctrine of emanation on the basis of necessity. This must necessarily involve one in a species of pantheism. As has been explained by Harnack 1, there is a strain of pantheism running through the system. On the other hand, Dean Inge does not succeed in removing the difficulty in connection with the conception of the One as transcendent and Matter as 'not being'. It is on this basis that Harnack, Eucken, and Caird charge Plotinus with metaphysical dualism. 2. It naturally follows from his error in metaphysics as to the nature of reality that his ethics should prove faulty. This has been stressed in the paper and has also been acknowledged by Dean Inge. 3. His hope seems to be to graft the ethics of Christianity upon the stem of Neoplatonic philosophy. It seems clear, however, that the fundamental error of Neoplatonism in stressing the impersonal can never furnish a basis for modern belief. Christianity certainly stresses the personal both in man and in Deity.

In his exposition of the Religion of Neoplatonism it does not seem that the author makes a clear case. What was said concerning the emphasis upon the impersonal comes in here. His conception of worship is largely that of contemplation, meditation -- with special stress upon the intellectual. It does not seem reasonable that a system that finally ended with the incorporation of theurgy would be able to escape this same fate again. The fact that the vision of the One seems to stand at the center

1. Harnack. History of Dogma. Vol. I. p. 339.
2. Philos. of Plotinus. Vol I. p. 13-18 f.
3. " " " " II. p. 207-208.

of his religious conception is not an unmitigated evil but the fact that this vision is realized only in the mystical swoon into the One certainly will not appeal very strongly to this age.

My conclusion is that Neoplatonism is not a living philosophy. Its importance for us is historical. It belongs to the past rather than to the living present.

Russell Bigelow Lisle
38 Burt Street,
Lowell, Massachusetts.

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